diff options
| author | Nicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org> | 2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org> | 2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000 |
| commit | 1be510f9529cb082f802408b472a77d074b394c0 (patch) | |
| tree | b175f9d5fcb107576dabc768e7bd04d4a3e491a0 /zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131 | |
| parent | fa5098cf210b23ab4f419913e28af7b1b07dafb2 (diff) | |
| download | archives-master.tar archives-master.tar.gz archives-master.tar.bz2 archives-master.tar.xz archives-master.zip | |
Diffstat (limited to 'zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131')
31 files changed, 3441 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002380.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002380.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3caf49bf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002380.html @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131031643.GF21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002381.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131031643.GF21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 04:16:43 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2380">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2380">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2380">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2380">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Hello, + +Now that we have a working build system, we need to setup the last part, +which is package signing. And for this we need a GPG key. So it's time +to decide on some policy about PGP keys. + +We can look at how it was done at Mandriva. If I remember correctly : + - cooker packages were signed with a key stored on the build system + - stable release packages were signed at release time with an other + key, not stored on the build system, but stored on the server used + to prepare the release and generate the ISOs + - updates for main repository were managed by secteam, and signed by + secteam key. The secteam didn't use the build system but their own + servers, so the key was stored on their servers + - updates for contrib repository were signed using a key stored on the + build system + - backports for main and contrib repository were signed using a key + stored on the build system + +However there are a few problems with this : + - too many different keys, with different names, it's difficult to see + which ones are really official. + - keys stored on the build system were not secure (all contributors and + apprentice had shell access on the build system and could easily become + root using iurt or other techniques, and then access the secret keys). + We won't provide shell access on the same servers as the build system + so it should be more secure, however it is always possible that a + server be compromised, with all the pgp keys on it, so we should plan + for it, and be able to revoke keys if it happens + - using a different key for developement version, and released version + means we need to resign all packages for the release, taking a lot + of time, cpu, and bandwidth to copy the packages between different + servers + - updates will be done using the same build system, so there is no use + to have two different keys for release and updates packages + - signed packages are supposed to prevent someone from modifying + packages on the mirrors. However the public key used to verify the + packages is downloaded from the mirror, and could be modified too. + So it would be very easy to create a fake mirror with modified + packages. We should fix that by allowing only trusted keys to be used. + + +So I propose that we use two keys : + - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This + key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> + - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is + not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, + and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this + key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but + not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key + is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), + and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything + else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is + sent on public keyservers. + - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. + We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been + signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the + keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature + from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has + not been revoked). + - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is + too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the + key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no + longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with + the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. + +According to this page : +<A HREF="http://www.cs.arizona.edu/stork/packagemanagersecurity/attacks-on-package-managers.html">http://www.cs.arizona.edu/stork/packagemanagersecurity/attacks-on-package-managers.html</A> +there is also a few things we need to improve in urpmi to make it more +secure (signed hdlists, and expiration dates on hdlists), but this is +for later. + +In this thread : +<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html</A> +misc proposed that we publish tarballs of our software on the mirrors, +and sign them using a pgp key. So we need a key for that. We also want +to sign ISOs, maybe with a different key. So I think we can do the same +as for packages key, we create new keys for software releases and for +ISOs, and we sign those keys with the board@ key. And we can tell +everybody that all files released by the project are always signed by +a key that was signed by the board@ key. + +If we decide to do this, someone from board could generate the key next +week at fosdem after the election, save it on usb key for other board +members, and give the fingerprint to everybody to sign the key. + +Any opinions on this ? Or other ideas ? Or comments ? + +Nicolas + +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2380">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2380">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2380">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2380">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3fabfb10e --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4637A4.8030106%40animeneko.net%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002380.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002385.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Motoko-chan</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4637A4.8030106%40animeneko.net%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">motokochan at animeneko.net + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 05:16:36 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2381">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2381">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2381">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2381">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On 01/30/2011 07:16 PM, nicolas vigier wrote: +><i> So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>><i> - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>><i> key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>Sounds good to me. + +><i> - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>><i> not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>><i> and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>><i> key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>><i> not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>><i> is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>><i> and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>><i> else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>><i> sent on public keyservers. +</I>If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks +where an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It +would require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems +compromised to have that key compromised. + + +><i> - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>><i> We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>><i> signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>><i> keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>><i> from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>><i> not been revoked). +</I>What about third-party repositories, like PLF is to Mandriva? Making +that change would require that each of those repository owners have +their key signed to work with the urpmi framework. This could either +mean the death of urpmi for managing packages, diluting the trust of the +board@ key, or discouraging outside contributions. + +What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +well by prompting on new keys. + + +><i> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one +year. It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would +cause. Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing +packages when they are turned into a release. + + - Michael +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2381">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2381">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2381">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2381">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002382.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002382.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..67276d225 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002382.html @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] BS down + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20BS%20down&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4670F5.2040707%40iki.fi%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002394.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002384.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] BS down</H1> + <B>Thomas Backlund</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20BS%20down&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4670F5.2040707%40iki.fi%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] BS down">tmb at iki.fi + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 09:21:09 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2382">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2382">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2382">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2382">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Pascal Terjan skrev 31.1.2011 00:54: +><i> +</I>><i> All packages have been rebuild, BS should be back in its original state +</I>><i> +</I> +Have you also re-enabled youri reuploading check ? + +-- +Thomas + + +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2382">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2382">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2382">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2382">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002383.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002383.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..016831140 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002383.html @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20%5BMageia-sysadm%5D%20Accident&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTimZZD-4rneR%3DfsR%3DYBFA33AfbqTV5%3DQPHAsLftv%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002384.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002422.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident</H1> + <B>Thierry Vignaud</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20%5BMageia-sysadm%5D%20Accident&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTimZZD-4rneR%3DfsR%3DYBFA33AfbqTV5%3DQPHAsLftv%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident">thierry.vignaud at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 09:49:52 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2383">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2383">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2383">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2383">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On 29 January 2011 20:58, Pascal Terjan <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">pterjan at gmail.com</A>> wrote: +><i> Sorry everyone, while removing my tests run on valstar, as that's not +</I>><i> the best place for tests, I removed bootsrap repository :( +</I>><i> I have stopped the build system and Nanar is sending back his copy of +</I>><i> the repository. +</I> +So you really want to be slaped with chains on every BS you touch :-) ? +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2383">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2383">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2383">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2383">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002384.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002384.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ff88a9818 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002384.html @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] BS down + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20BS%20down&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTi%3DyFnrosS%2B5xGzD%3Do2wGe4%3D432BJ2jbEMXufcuq%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002382.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002383.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] BS down</H1> + <B>Pascal Terjan</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20BS%20down&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTi%3DyFnrosS%2B5xGzD%3Do2wGe4%3D432BJ2jbEMXufcuq%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] BS down">pterjan at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 10:53:39 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2384">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2384">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2384">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2384">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 08:21, Thomas Backlund <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">tmb at iki.fi</A>> wrote: +><i> Pascal Terjan skrev 31.1.2011 00:54: +</I>>><i> +</I>>><i> All packages have been rebuild, BS should be back in its original state +</I>>><i> +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Have you also re-enabled youri reuploading check ? +</I> +Yes that's what I mean by "BS should be back in its original state" +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2384">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2384">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2384">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2384">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002385.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002385.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dca8a8c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002385.html @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131110233.GA12283%40shikamaru.fr%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002381.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002389.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Remy CLOUARD</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131110233.GA12283%40shikamaru.fr%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">shikamaru at mandriva.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 12:02:33 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2385">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2385">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2385">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2385">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 08:16:36PM -0800, Motoko-chan wrote: +><i> On 01/30/2011 07:16 PM, nicolas vigier wrote: +</I>[...] +><i> > - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>><i> > We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>><i> > signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>><i> > keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>><i> > from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>><i> > not been revoked). +</I>><i> What about third-party repositories, like PLF is to Mandriva? Making +</I>><i> that change would require that each of those repository owners have +</I>><i> their key signed to work with the urpmi framework. This could either +</I>><i> mean the death of urpmi for managing packages, diluting the trust of +</I>><i> the board@ key, or discouraging outside contributions. +</I>><i> +</I>Well, not necessarily, third party repos could just provide their keys +and describe how users should import it. AFAIK, that’s what’s done on +Fedora side with the rpmfusion repo. +><i> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed +</I>><i> by board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is +</I>><i> signed by a different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and +</I>><i> CentOS works very well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> +</I>I’ve never used guis on Fedora, but for me you could as well install the +rpm containing the third party keys with yum and the --nogpgcheck +switch. + +I guess this option should be implemented in urpmi for that to work on +our side. + +Regards, +-- +Rémy CLOUARD +() ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail +/\ www.asciiribbon.org - against proprietary attachments +-------------- next part -------------- +A non-text attachment was scrubbed... +Name: not available +Type: application/pgp-signature +Size: 230 bytes +Desc: not available +URL: </pipermail/mageia-dev/attachments/20110131/b3308c6b/attachment.asc> +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2385">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2385">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2385">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2385">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002386.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002386.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8417bccf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002386.html @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTik8tetqX1DCSp2LAU_qOZEoXVDOZkjCF9Yy0Pae%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002403.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002387.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Christophe Fergeau</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTik8tetqX1DCSp2LAU_qOZEoXVDOZkjCF9Yy0Pae%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">cfergeau at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 12:13:04 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2386">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2386">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2386">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2386">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Hey, + +2011/1/31 nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>>: +><i>  - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i>   too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i>   key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i>   longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i>   the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I> +Will all existing packages be reviewed and resigned when they key is +thought to have been compromised? What happens on user systems when +this is done? Will they have to reinstall all packages signed with the +new key? + +Christophe +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2386">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2386">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2386">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2386">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002387.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002387.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12f573a9f --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002387.html @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131114317.GC10402%40virgo.home.nanardon.zarb.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002386.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002388.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Olivier Thauvin</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131114317.GC10402%40virgo.home.nanardon.zarb.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">nanardon at nanardon.zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 12:43:17 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2387">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2387">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2387">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2387">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>* Christophe Fergeau (<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">cfergeau at gmail.com</A>) wrote: +><i> Hey, +</I>><i> +</I>><i> 2011/1/31 nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>>: +</I>><i> >  - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> >   too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> >   key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> >   longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> >   the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Will all existing packages be reviewed and resigned when they key is +</I>><i> thought to have been compromised? What happens on user systems when +</I>><i> this is done? Will they have to reinstall all packages signed with the +</I>><i> new key? +</I> +Re-signing packages will not change their name-evr-arch, so on urpmi/rpm +side packages does not have to be updated. But from a user point of view +they installed packages (then checked it) before the compromission, ie +when packages were trustable. + +So in case of compromission packages must be resigned but I don't think +users have to reinstall it as their content won't changes. + +In the case a packages is compromised (a package with malware is +introduced on the mirror) then we'll have to provide an update with a +clean package and in this specific case users will have to update it. + +><i> +</I>><i> Christophe +</I>-- + +Olivier Thauvin +CNRS - LATMOS +♖ ♘ ♗ ♕ ♔ ♗ ♘ ♖ +-------------- next part -------------- +A non-text attachment was scrubbed... +Name: not available +Type: application/pgp-signature +Size: 197 bytes +Desc: not available +URL: </pipermail/mageia-dev/attachments/20110131/4b41d3ff/attachment.asc> +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2387">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2387">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2387">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2387">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45c8e9f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296485834.12892.27.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002387.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002394.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296485834.12892.27.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 15:57:14 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2388">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2388">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2388">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2388">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 04:16 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> Hello, +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Now that we have a working build system, we need to setup the last part, +</I>><i> which is package signing. And for this we need a GPG key. So it's time +</I>><i> to decide on some policy about PGP keys. +</I>><i> +</I> +><i> - keys stored on the build system were not secure (all contributors and +</I>><i> apprentice had shell access on the build system and could easily become +</I>><i> root using iurt or other techniques, and then access the secret keys). +</I> +Mhh, the keys are stored on raoh, and no one except few selected people +had access ( granted, there was some flaws since I know someone who +managed to get access one day despite not being authorized ). + + +><i> So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>><i> - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>><i> key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>><i> - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>><i> not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>><i> and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>><i> key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>><i> not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>><i> is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>><i> and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>><i> else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>><i> sent on public keyservers. +</I> +If we want to sign the key, we will have a network connection, no ? + + +><i> - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>><i> We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>><i> signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>><i> keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>><i> from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>><i> not been revoked). +</I> +><i> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I> +Since computer get faster days and days ( until the days you buy them ), +and there is new cryptographic techniques found each year. So it seems +to me quite sane to change the keys every 2/3 years. More often mean +that we will forget how we did, and too often could be bad ( even if +IMHO, one key per release would be nice but maybe overkill ). + +This way, we can check the procedure is working, we will have a robust +key, following up to date requirements of security. And we can fix +problem if any without having the pressure of "the key got compromised". + + + +><i> In this thread : +</I>><i> <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html</A> +</I>><i> misc proposed that we publish tarballs of our software on the mirrors, +</I>><i> and sign them using a pgp key. So we need a key for that. We also want +</I>><i> to sign ISOs, maybe with a different key. So I think we can do the same +</I>><i> as for packages key, we create new keys for software releases and for +</I>><i> ISOs, and we sign those keys with the board@ key. And we can tell +</I>><i> everybody that all files released by the project are always signed by +</I>><i> a key that was signed by the board@ key. +</I> +Yup. I would also go on making sure the key is signed ( web of trust, +etc ). + +><i> If we decide to do this, someone from board could generate the key next +</I>><i> week at fosdem after the election, save it on usb key for other board +</I>><i> members, and give the fingerprint to everybody to sign the key. +</I> +I would rather make sure that the key cannot be used by only one board +member. Not that I do not trust people for that ( they are the board +after all ), but it would be safer to have it distributed and resilient +if someone steal the key ( like a burglar, etc ). + +Maybe have it password protected should be sufficient ( except if people +forget that password, or stick it to the key ). + +Pascal proposed to use <A HREF="https://store.ironkey.com/personal">https://store.ironkey.com/personal</A> , on the +thread +<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html</A> + +Another last solution to prevent theft would to use shamir secret +sharing ( as also said in the other thread, but maybe I am too insistant +on this wonderful cryptographic invention ). This way, people would have +to steal several part of the file to get something usable. +( for Harry Potter fan, think of horcruxes ) + + +And also, I think we should routinely make sure the key is readable +( ie, that people know where it is, and the support is still good ), so +we do not discover one day that half the key keeper lost the key while +moving, thinking someone else had it, and the other half stored it near +magnet, rendering it unreadable. + +And make sure the key is not sent as cleartext on the web too. + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2388">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2388">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2388">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2388">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002389.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002389.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f189a0d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002389.html @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131150355.GH21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002385.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002390.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131150355.GH21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 16:03:55 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2389">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2389">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2389">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2389">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: + +><i> On 01/30/2011 07:16 PM, nicolas vigier wrote: +</I>>><i> So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>>><i> - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>>><i> key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>><i> Sounds good to me. +</I>><i> +</I>>><i> - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>>><i> not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>>><i> and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>>><i> key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>>><i> not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>>><i> is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>>><i> and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>>><i> else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>>><i> sent on public keyservers. +</I>><i> If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +</I>><i> signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where +</I>><i> an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would +</I>><i> require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to +</I>><i> have that key compromised. +</I> +Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have +a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members, +so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who +have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the +passphrase don't have the key ? +However we should also try to do something simple, to avoid losing +access to the key because it's too complicate. + +>><i> - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>>><i> We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>>><i> signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>>><i> keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>>><i> from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>>><i> not been revoked). +</I>><i> What about third-party repositories, like PLF is to Mandriva? Making that +</I>><i> change would require that each of those repository owners have their key +</I>><i> signed to work with the urpmi framework. This could either mean the death +</I>><i> of urpmi for managing packages, diluting the trust of the board@ key, or +</I>><i> discouraging outside contributions. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +</I>><i> board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +</I>><i> different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +</I>><i> well by prompting on new keys. +</I> +For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. + +>><i> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>>><i> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>>><i> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>>><i> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>>><i> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> when they are turned into a release. +</I> +I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : + - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release + - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life + - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked + key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly + on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to + expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing + a revoked key. + +About signing each release with a different key, as they are signed from +the same server, if a key is leaked, the others are likely to be leaked +too, so I don't think it's very useful to use different keys. + +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2389">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2389">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2389">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2389">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002390.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002390.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..71241534c --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002390.html @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTikVwCHA%3DLaKJC6_hUcQSKofeS5oxZBcdW2rFo84%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002389.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002391.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Thierry Vignaud</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTikVwCHA%3DLaKJC6_hUcQSKofeS5oxZBcdW2rFo84%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">thierry.vignaud at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 16:38:27 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2390">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2390">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2390">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2390">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On 31 January 2011 16:03, nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>> wrote: +>><i> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +</I>>><i> board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +</I>>><i> different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +</I>>><i> well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +</I>><i> most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +</I>><i> can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +</I>><i> manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +</I>><i> downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. +</I> +uh? what about patents? +unless it's a separate repo ? +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2390">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2390">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2390">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2390">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002391.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002391.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..196dd0a65 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002391.html @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131154259.GI21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002390.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002392.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131154259.GI21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 16:42:59 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2391">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2391">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2391">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2391">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Thierry Vignaud wrote: + +><i> On 31 January 2011 16:03, nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>> wrote: +</I>><i> >> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +</I>><i> >> board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +</I>><i> >> different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +</I>><i> >> well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +</I>><i> > most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +</I>><i> > can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +</I>><i> > manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +</I>><i> > downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> uh? what about patents? +</I>><i> unless it's a separate repo ? +</I> +Yes, it's a separate repository, the tainted repository : +<A HREF="http://www.mageia.org/wiki/doku.php?id=mirrors_policy">http://www.mageia.org/wiki/doku.php?id=mirrors_policy</A> + +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2391">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2391">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2391">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2391">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002392.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002392.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81664ebf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002392.html @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTin2YjfFXnb0MwA9w%3Da4VJfWXTdrZ3On93NBT_ap%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002391.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002395.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Christophe Fergeau</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTin2YjfFXnb0MwA9w%3Da4VJfWXTdrZ3On93NBT_ap%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">cfergeau at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 17:08:01 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2392">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2392">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2392">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2392">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>2011/1/31 nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>>: +><i> On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>>><i> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +</I>>><i> board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +</I>>><i> different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +</I>>><i> well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +</I>><i> most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +</I>><i> can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +</I>><i> manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +</I>><i> downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. +</I> +You definitely want to let people set up their own local package +repositories or to use 3rd party repositories, for example I did it +sometimes at Mandriva for some tests, and I want to do it again for +internal work/proprietary packages. I'm ok with having rpm/urpmi +telling you you're about to install packages with an unknown +signature/... as long as you can override it and tell it to let you +install the package. + +Christophe +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2392">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2392">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2392">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2392">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..731545d38 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296490705.12892.41.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002400.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002396.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296490705.12892.41.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 17:18:25 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2393">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2393">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2393">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2393">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> +</I>><i> > If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +</I>><i> > signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where +</I>><i> > an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would +</I>><i> > require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to +</I>><i> > have that key compromised. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have +</I>><i> a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members, +</I>><i> so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who +</I>><i> have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the +</I>><i> passphrase don't have the key ? +</I> +Like : <A HREF="http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss">http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss</A> ? + +Too bad it doesn't seems to be much maintained :/ + + +><i> >> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> >> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> >> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> >> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> >> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> > Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> > release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> > It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> > Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> > when they are turned into a release. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : +</I>><i> - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release +</I>><i> - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life +</I> +We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +enough IMHO ) +2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +push my key after extending the expiration date ). + +And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but +they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ). +And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without +harrassing too much can be quite difficult ). + +We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used +anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say +the key is expired for good, and that's all ). + +><i> - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> a revoked key. +</I> +The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +about older keys. + +If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +old key is compromised offline. + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2393">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2393">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2393">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2393">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002394.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002394.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dfabedb87 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002394.html @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131165111.GJ21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002388.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002382.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131165111.GJ21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 17:51:11 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2394">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2394">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2394">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2394">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: + +><i> > So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>><i> > - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>><i> > key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>><i> > - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>><i> > not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>><i> > and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>><i> > key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>><i> > not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>><i> > is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>><i> > and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>><i> > else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>><i> > sent on public keyservers. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> If we want to sign the key, we will have a network connection, no ? +</I> +We can sign it, and copy the signed key on an other computer to upload +it. Doing something like this : + - We have Computer A with internet connection. + - We have Computer B without internet connection, running on a livecd + with tmpfs + - On computer A: we download the packages@ public key, and the public + key of all board members (if needed), and save this on a USB key + - On computer B: we use the USB key to import all public keys in keyring + - On computer B: We generate the board@ key + - On computer B: We sign the packages@ key using board@ key + - On computer B: We save the signed packages@ key, and public board@ + key on the USB key + - On computer A: We use the USB key to upload the signed packages@ key, + and board@ key on keyservers + - On computer B: We encrypt the board@ private key using public key of + board members or shamir secret sharing, and copy the encrypted files on + USB keys to give them to board members + - We destroy computer B (or alternatively we simply turn it off to + remove tmpfs) + +><i> > If we decide to do this, someone from board could generate the key next +</I>><i> > week at fosdem after the election, save it on usb key for other board +</I>><i> > members, and give the fingerprint to everybody to sign the key. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> I would rather make sure that the key cannot be used by only one board +</I>><i> member. Not that I do not trust people for that ( they are the board +</I>><i> after all ), but it would be safer to have it distributed and resilient +</I>><i> if someone steal the key ( like a burglar, etc ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Maybe have it password protected should be sufficient ( except if people +</I>><i> forget that password, or stick it to the key ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Pascal proposed to use <A HREF="https://store.ironkey.com/personal">https://store.ironkey.com/personal</A> , on the +</I>><i> thread +</I>><i> <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html</A> +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Another last solution to prevent theft would to use shamir secret +</I>><i> sharing ( as also said in the other thread, but maybe I am too insistant +</I>><i> on this wonderful cryptographic invention ). This way, people would have +</I>><i> to steal several part of the file to get something usable. +</I>><i> ( for Harry Potter fan, think of horcruxes ) +</I> +Oops, I should have mentioned this thread in the 1st mail (but didn't +find it yesterday). + +><i> And also, I think we should routinely make sure the key is readable +</I>><i> ( ie, that people know where it is, and the support is still good ), so +</I>><i> we do not discover one day that half the key keeper lost the key while +</I>><i> moving, thinking someone else had it, and the other half stored it near +</I>><i> magnet, rendering it unreadable. +</I> +Maybe we could test it every year at fosdem ? + +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2394">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2394">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2394">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2394">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002395.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002395.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..386ec11f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002395.html @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131170116.GK21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002392.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002400.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131170116.GK21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 18:01:16 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2395">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2395">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2395">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2395">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Christophe Fergeau wrote: + +><i> 2011/1/31 nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>>: +</I>><i> > On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> >> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +</I>><i> >> board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +</I>><i> >> different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +</I>><i> >> well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +</I>><i> > most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +</I>><i> > can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +</I>><i> > manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +</I>><i> > downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> You definitely want to let people set up their own local package +</I>><i> repositories or to use 3rd party repositories, for example I did it +</I>><i> sometimes at Mandriva for some tests, and I want to do it again for +</I>><i> internal work/proprietary packages. I'm ok with having rpm/urpmi +</I>><i> telling you you're about to install packages with an unknown +</I>><i> signature/... as long as you can override it and tell it to let you +</I>><i> install the package. +</I> +Yes, we should add an option somewhere to allow this. + +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2395">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2395">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2395">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2395">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ae412c9f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131172646.GL21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002393.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002397.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131172646.GL21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 18:26:46 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2396">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2396">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2396">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2396">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: + +><i> Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > > If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +</I>><i> > > signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where +</I>><i> > > an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would +</I>><i> > > require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to +</I>><i> > > have that key compromised. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have +</I>><i> > a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members, +</I>><i> > so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who +</I>><i> > have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the +</I>><i> > passphrase don't have the key ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Like : <A HREF="http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss">http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss</A> ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Too bad it doesn't seems to be much maintained :/ +</I> +Interesting. + +><i> > >> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> > >> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> > >> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> > >> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> > >> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> > > Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> > > release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> > > It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> > > Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> > > when they are turned into a release. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : +</I>><i> > - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release +</I>><i> > - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life +</I>><i> +</I>><i> We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +</I>><i> enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I> +Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages +if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do +too often if it's not needed. + +><i> And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but +</I>><i> they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ). +</I>><i> And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without +</I>><i> harrassing too much can be quite difficult ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used +</I>><i> anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say +</I>><i> the key is expired for good, and that's all ). +</I> +If we decide that a key won't be used anymore, and don't want to care +about protecting it, I think we should revoke it (or its signature) as +soon as possible, instead of waiting for it to expire. + +I think the only use of expiration date would be if one day all +known keyservers are down and never come back (I think it's unlikely to +happen, or we will also have other problems), or we lose all private +keys, so we can't revoke them or their signature. But if we lose all +private keys, we will also have other problems (like not being able to +sign a new key), so we should avoid it. + +><i> > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> > a revoked key. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> about older keys. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +</I>><i> will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +</I>><i> say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +</I>><i> old key is compromised offline. +</I> +If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. Instead of deciding +now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2396">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2396">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2396">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2396">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002397.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002397.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..306031dfc --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002397.html @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296496587.12892.104.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002396.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002398.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296496587.12892.104.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 18:56:27 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2397">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2397">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2397">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2397">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 18:26 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> +</I>><i> > Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > > On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I> +><i> > > >> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> > > >> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> > > >> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> > > >> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> > > >> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> > > > Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> > > > release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> > > > It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> > > > Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> > > > when they are turned into a release. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : +</I>><i> > > - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release +</I>><i> > > - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +</I>><i> > enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> > 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> > push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages +</I>><i> if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do +</I>><i> too often if it's not needed. +</I> +Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with +the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least, +it is for me ). + +><i> > And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but +</I>><i> > they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ). +</I>><i> > And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without +</I>><i> > harrassing too much can be quite difficult ). +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used +</I>><i> > anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say +</I>><i> > the key is expired for good, and that's all ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> If we decide that a key won't be used anymore, and don't want to care +</I>><i> about protecting it, I think we should revoke it (or its signature) as +</I>><i> soon as possible, instead of waiting for it to expire. +</I> +Well, we can do both. Revoke it, and for those that still use it and +didn't update, let it expires. + +><i> I think the only use of expiration date would be if one day all +</I>><i> known keyservers are down and never come back (I think it's unlikely to +</I>><i> happen, or we will also have other problems) +</I> +Yep, unlikely ( unless in Egypt ) + +Maybe this also mean we should have a SKS server too +( <A HREF="http://minskyprimus.net/sks/">http://minskyprimus.net/sks/</A> ). + +><i> , or we lose all private +</I>><i> keys, so we can't revoke them or their signature. But if we lose all +</I>><i> private keys, we will also have other problems (like not being able to +</I>><i> sign a new key), so we should avoid it. +</I> +Usually, revokation certificates can be prepared in advance. ( in case +you lose the key, simply ). So this should also be done. + +The point about losing all keys also mean we need to take backup in +accounts ( for example, encrypt them, bacula can do it client side ). + +><i> > > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> > > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> > > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> > > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> > > a revoked key. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> > about older keys. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> > private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +</I>><i> > will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +</I>><i> > say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +</I>><i> > old key is compromised offline. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +</I>><i> it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Instead of deciding +</I>><i> now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +</I>><i> at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. +</I> +Wouldn't it be too late ? + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2397">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2397">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2397">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2397">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53bc05c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131191224.GM21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002397.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002399.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131191224.GM21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:12:24 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2398">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2398">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2398">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2398">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: + +><i> Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 18:26 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > > We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +</I>><i> > > enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> > > 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> > > push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages +</I>><i> > if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do +</I>><i> > too often if it's not needed. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with +</I>><i> the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least, +</I>><i> it is for me ). +</I> +Oh, I misunderstood this as I imagined it was not possible to change +expiration date on a key as it would be difficult to check if the change +was done before expiration. But after checking, it is indeed possible, +and it is even possible to do it after the expiration date. + +So we can do it, but we should remember that it does not protect against +a key compromised after it has expired (as someone stealing the key +can change the expiration date even after it has expired). + +So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was +updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration +time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days +before it expire ? + +><i> > > > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> > > > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> > > > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> > > > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> > > > a revoked key. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> > > about older keys. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> > > private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +</I>><i> > > will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +</I>><i> > > say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +</I>><i> > > old key is compromised offline. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +</I>><i> > it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Instead of deciding +</I>><i> > now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +</I>><i> > at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Wouldn't it be too late ? +</I> +Considering that it is possible to update expiration date even after it +has expired, this expiration date doesn't protect against some technology +that would allow people in the futur to bruteforce the private key. + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2398">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2398">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2398">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2398">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002399.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002399.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6cacf13c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002399.html @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296502627.12892.132.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002398.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002401.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296502627.12892.132.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:37:07 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2399">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2399">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2399">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2399">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 20:12 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> +</I>><i> > Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with +</I>><i> > the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least, +</I>><i> > it is for me ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Oh, I misunderstood this as I imagined it was not possible to change +</I>><i> expiration date on a key as it would be difficult to check if the change +</I>><i> was done before expiration. But after checking, it is indeed possible, +</I>><i> and it is even possible to do it after the expiration date. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> So we can do it, but we should remember that it does not protect against +</I>><i> a key compromised after it has expired (as someone stealing the key +</I>><i> can change the expiration date even after it has expired). +</I> +But we would notice it, I guess. That could be a good idea to check if +any of our old key do not appear on the keyring with a non expired +date :) + +><i> So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was +</I>><i> updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration +</I>><i> time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days +</I>><i> before it expire ? +</I> +Or maybe we can keep the expiration date to indicate when the key should +not be used anymore ( ie, as a indication, nothing more, as we cannot +guarantee anything ), and once the expiration date occurs ( expiration +date set on our copy of the key ), we upload the revocation certificate +( with we == a cronjob , by checking the date of the key ) + +We could even use this on client side to indicate that a release is no +longer supported. ( ie, DRY principle ). + +><i> > > Instead of deciding +</I>><i> > > now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +</I>><i> > > at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Wouldn't it be too late ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Considering that it is possible to update expiration date even after it +</I>><i> has expired, this expiration date doesn't protect against some technology +</I>><i> that would allow people in the futur to bruteforce the private key. +</I> +It is up to the tool to use or not the expiration. Ie, if we tell to +urpmi "do not trust expired key", we can as well say "keep a list of key +that have expired and never trust a key, even if it say the contrary". + +But indeed, that doesn't sound very secure per se :/ + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2399">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2399">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2399">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2399">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002400.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002400.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c1522b441 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002400.html @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312040.00434.maarten.vanraes%40gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002395.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002393.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Maarten Vanraes</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312040.00434.maarten.vanraes%40gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">maarten.vanraes at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:40:00 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2400">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2400">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2400">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2400">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Op maandag 31 januari 2011 18:01:16 schreef nicolas vigier: +><i> On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Christophe Fergeau wrote: +</I>><i> > 2011/1/31 nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>>: +</I>><i> > > On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> > >> What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed +</I>><i> > >> by board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed +</I>><i> > >> by a different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS +</I>><i> > >> works very well by prompting on new keys. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > For PLF packages, they will now be included on Mageia repository, so +</I>><i> > > most users should not need to use external repositories. However we +</I>><i> > > can add an option or prompt to disable this check, or an option to +</I>><i> > > manually add a new trusted key. As long as it's not automatically +</I>><i> > > downloaded from the mirror without asking for any confirmation. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > You definitely want to let people set up their own local package +</I>><i> > repositories or to use 3rd party repositories, for example I did it +</I>><i> > sometimes at Mandriva for some tests, and I want to do it again for +</I>><i> > internal work/proprietary packages. I'm ok with having rpm/urpmi +</I>><i> > telling you you're about to install packages with an unknown +</I>><i> > signature/... as long as you can override it and tell it to let you +</I>><i> > install the package. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Yes, we should add an option somewhere to allow this. +</I> +isn't it easier if local overrides would also provide a way to add keys that +can be validated, imo. + +I'm writing urpmi-proxy, and and i would like to have a good way to have local +overrides with their own key signed. + +perhaps if a diff key is detected, a certain procedure could be started that +could ask the user if this key is trusted or not, or refer to somewhere else? + +also, thinking on the upgrade path from Mandriva, i'm not sure how... +</PRE> + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2400">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2400">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2400">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2400">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002401.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002401.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc1af8cdb --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002401.html @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312042.44309.maarten.vanraes%40gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002399.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002402.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Maarten Vanraes</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312042.44309.maarten.vanraes%40gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">maarten.vanraes at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:42:44 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2401">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2401">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2401">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2401">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Op maandag 31 januari 2011 20:12:24 schreef nicolas vigier: +><i> On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> > Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 18:26 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > > On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> > > > We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems +</I>><i> > > > quite enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> > > > 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> > > > push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old +</I>><i> > > packages if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we +</I>><i> > > want to do too often if it's not needed. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with +</I>><i> > the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least, +</I>><i> > it is for me ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Oh, I misunderstood this as I imagined it was not possible to change +</I>><i> expiration date on a key as it would be difficult to check if the change +</I>><i> was done before expiration. But after checking, it is indeed possible, +</I>><i> and it is even possible to do it after the expiration date. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> So we can do it, but we should remember that it does not protect against +</I>><i> a key compromised after it has expired (as someone stealing the key +</I>><i> can change the expiration date even after it has expired). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was +</I>><i> updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration +</I>><i> time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days +</I>><i> before it expire ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> > > > > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a +</I>><i> > > > > leaked +</I>><i> > > > > +</I>><i> > > > > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) +</I>><i> > > > > immediatly on all key servers, which should be faster than +</I>><i> > > > > waiting for the key to expire. And replacing an expired key is +</I>><i> > > > > not more simple than replacing a revoked key. +</I>><i> > > > +</I>><i> > > > The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> > > > about older keys. +</I>><i> > > > +</I>><i> > > > If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get +</I>><i> > > > our private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, +</I>><i> > > > attackers will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the +</I>><i> > > > plan is to say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially +</I>><i> > > > screwed if a old key is compromised offline. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +</I>><i> > > it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > Instead of deciding +</I>><i> > > now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we +</I>><i> > > look at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Wouldn't it be too late ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Considering that it is possible to update expiration date even after it +</I>><i> has expired, this expiration date doesn't protect against some technology +</I>><i> that would allow people in the futur to bruteforce the private key. +</I> + +what if there is no network access? keyservers are nice, but an isolated +install should still be possible... +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2401">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2401">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2401">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2401">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002402.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002402.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0186fbf95 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002402.html @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3Cop.vp6w3jn1n7mcit%40hodgins.homeip.net%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002401.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002403.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>David W. Hodgins</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3Cop.vp6w3jn1n7mcit%40hodgins.homeip.net%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">davidwhodgins at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 21:41:34 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2402">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2402">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2402">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2402">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011 14:12:24 -0500, nicolas vigier <<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">boklm at mars-attacks.org</A>> wrote: + +><i> So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was +</I>><i> updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration +</I>><i> time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days +</I>><i> before it expire ? +</I> +What about systems that are not connected to the internet? I see no +point in having the key expire. If a person chooses to install an +old version after the release has reached end of life, that is their +choice. They shouldn't have to jump through hoops, just to get the +installer to run. + +If a key gets compromised, it gets revoked, and the revocation certificate +gets distributed as an update, along with a new key. + +Regards, Dave Hodgins +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2402">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2402">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2402">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2402">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002403.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002403.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..52ac98432 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002403.html @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312149.p0VLnX9h027145%40smtp-vbr12.xs4all.nl%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002402.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002386.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Dick Gevers</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C201101312149.p0VLnX9h027145%40smtp-vbr12.xs4all.nl%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">dvgevers at xs4all.nl + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 22:49:32 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2403">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2403">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2403">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2403">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011 17:18:25 +0100, Michael Scherer wrote about Re: +[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing: + +><i>The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i>about older keys. +</I>><i> +</I>><i>If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i>private key by bruteforce on the public one +</I> +You can never ever obtain the private key from the public one, that is +impossible. It can only be compromised if someone looses the private key +plus the password is cracked. + +Cheers. +=Dick Gevers= +</PRE> + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2403">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2403">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2403">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2403">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002404.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002404.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b6b971fc --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002404.html @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20please%20release%20mgarepo-1.9.8&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTincpu3r44ZsajtU%3DYza3LWGDmJzAk6kc8C1vX4r%40mail.gmail.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002422.html"> + + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8</H1> + <B>Thierry Vignaud</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20please%20release%20mgarepo-1.9.8&In-Reply-To=%3CAANLkTincpu3r44ZsajtU%3DYza3LWGDmJzAk6kc8C1vX4r%40mail.gmail.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8">thierry.vignaud at gmail.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A></li> + + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2404">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2404">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2404">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2404">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Hi + +Please fix your upload process since: +- mgarepo-1.9.8 (which has fixed sync option) is half-released + (aka the SRPM is in <A HREF="http://repository.mageia.org/mageiatools/SRPMS/">http://repository.mageia.org/mageiatools/SRPMS/</A> + but binary packages are still 1.9.7) +- also since you're using setup.py instead of plain old Makefile, we're missing + the release bits in order to do a tarball + it would be nice if this could be documented + (even "VERSION=$(egrep '^VERSION' mgarepo|cut -f 2 -d=|sed -e +'s!"!!g'); cd ..;ln -s mgarepo mgarepo-$VERSION; tar cfz +mgarepo-$VERSION{.tgz,/}") + but please documente it. + +thanks. +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A></li> + + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2404">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2404">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2404">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2404">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002422.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002422.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ae2452ef4 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002422.html @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20Dev%20Team%20Call%20To%20Action...&In-Reply-To=%3C4D47132A.20503%40borg1911.com%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002383.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002404.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action...</H1> + <B>Nex6</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20Dev%20Team%20Call%20To%20Action...&In-Reply-To=%3C4D47132A.20503%40borg1911.com%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action...">borg at borg1911.com + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:53:14 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2422">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2422">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2422">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2422">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>I am interested in the dev team still + + +On 1/26/2011 4:59 PM, Maarten Vanraes wrote: +><i> Hi, +</I>><i> +</I>><i> I sent email on mageia-dev regarding the -dev team and "a call for action": +</I>><i> <A HREF="http://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110127/002345.html">http://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110127/002345.html</A> +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Are you still interested in -dev team or like to contribute for this +</I>><i> particular thing, could you react to the email in question? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Regards, +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Maarten (aka AL13N) +</I> +</PRE> + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2422">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2422">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2422">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2422">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/author.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/author.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2fc58e6f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/author.html @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <title>The Mageia-dev 31 January 2011 Archive by author</title> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="noindex,follow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <a name="start"></A> + <h1>31 January 2011 Archives by author</h1> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p><b>Starting:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 04:16:43 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Ending:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Messages:</b> 26<p> + <ul> + +<LI><A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2382"> </A> +<I>Thomas Backlund +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2385"> </A> +<I>Remy CLOUARD +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2386"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2392"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2403"> </A> +<I>Dick Gevers +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2402"> </A> +<I>David W. Hodgins +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2381"> </A> +<I>Motoko-chan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A><A NAME="2422"> </A> +<I>Nex6 +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2388"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2393"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2397"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2399"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2384"> </A> +<I>Pascal Terjan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2387"> </A> +<I>Olivier Thauvin +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2400"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2401"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A><A NAME="2383"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2390"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A><A NAME="2404"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2380"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2389"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2391"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2394"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2395"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2396"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2398"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + + </ul> + <p> + <a name="end"><b>Last message date:</b></a> + <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Archived on:</b> <i>Thu Feb 3 17:48:11 CET 2011</i> + <p> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p> + <hr> + <i>This archive was generated by + Pipermail 0.09 (Mailman edition).</i> + </BODY> +</HTML> + diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/date.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/date.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ab8d70e49 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/date.html @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <title>The Mageia-dev 31 January 2011 Archive by date</title> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="noindex,follow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <a name="start"></A> + <h1>31 January 2011 Archives by date</h1> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + + + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p><b>Starting:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 04:16:43 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Ending:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Messages:</b> 26<p> + <ul> + +<LI><A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2380"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2381"> </A> +<I>Motoko-chan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2382"> </A> +<I>Thomas Backlund +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A><A NAME="2383"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2384"> </A> +<I>Pascal Terjan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2385"> </A> +<I>Remy CLOUARD +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2386"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2387"> </A> +<I>Olivier Thauvin +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2388"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2389"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2390"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2391"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2392"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2393"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2394"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2395"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2396"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2397"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2398"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2399"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2400"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2401"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A><A NAME="2422"> </A> +<I>Nex6 +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2402"> </A> +<I>David W. Hodgins +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2403"> </A> +<I>Dick Gevers +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A><A NAME="2404"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + + </ul> + <p> + <a name="end"><b>Last message date:</b></a> + <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Archived on:</b> <i>Thu Feb 3 17:48:11 CET 2011</i> + <p> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p> + <hr> + <i>This archive was generated by + Pipermail 0.09 (Mailman edition).</i> + </BODY> +</HTML> + diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/index.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/index.html new file mode 120000 index 000000000..db4b46f72 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/index.html @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +thread.html
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/subject.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/subject.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e384575f --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/subject.html @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <title>The Mageia-dev 31 January 2011 Archive by subject</title> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="noindex,follow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <a name="start"></A> + <h1>31 January 2011 Archives by subject</h1> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p><b>Starting:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 04:16:43 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Ending:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Messages:</b> 26<p> + <ul> + +<LI><A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A><A NAME="2383"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2382"> </A> +<I>Thomas Backlund +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2384"> </A> +<I>Pascal Terjan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A><A NAME="2422"> </A> +<I>Nex6 +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2380"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2381"> </A> +<I>Motoko-chan +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2385"> </A> +<I>Remy CLOUARD +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2386"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2387"> </A> +<I>Olivier Thauvin +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2388"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2389"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2390"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2391"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2392"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2393"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2394"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2395"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2396"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2397"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2398"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2399"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2400"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2401"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2402"> </A> +<I>David W. Hodgins +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2403"> </A> +<I>Dick Gevers +</I> + +<LI><A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A><A NAME="2404"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + + </ul> + <p> + <a name="end"><b>Last message date:</b></a> + <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Archived on:</b> <i>Thu Feb 3 17:48:11 CET 2011</i> + <p> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + <a href="thread.html#start">[ thread ]</a> + + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p> + <hr> + <i>This archive was generated by + Pipermail 0.09 (Mailman edition).</i> + </BODY> +</HTML> + diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/thread.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/thread.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7c23474f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/thread.html @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <title>The Mageia-dev 31 January 2011 Archive by thread</title> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="noindex,follow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <a name="start"></A> + <h1>31 January 2011 Archives by thread</h1> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p><b>Starting:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 04:16:43 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Ending:</b> <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Messages:</b> 26<p> + <ul> + +<!--0 01296443803- --> +<LI><A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2380"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<UL> +<!--1 01296443803-01296447396- --> +<LI><A HREF="002381.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2381"> </A> +<I>Motoko-chan +</I> + +<UL> +<!--2 01296443803-01296447396-01296471753- --> +<LI><A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2385"> </A> +<I>Remy CLOUARD +</I> + +<!--2 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235- --> +<LI><A HREF="002389.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2389"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<UL> +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296488307- --> +<LI><A HREF="002390.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2390"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296488307-01296488579- --> +<LI><A HREF="002391.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2391"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490081- --> +<LI><A HREF="002392.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2392"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490081-01296493276- --> +<LI><A HREF="002395.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2395"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490081-01296493276-01296502800- --> +<LI><A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2400"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705- --> +<LI><A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2393"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806- --> +<LI><A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2396"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806-01296496587- --> +<LI><A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2397"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806-01296496587-01296501144- --> +<LI><A HREF="002398.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2398"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806-01296496587-01296501144-01296502627- --> +<LI><A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2399"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806-01296496587-01296501144-01296502964- --> +<LI><A HREF="002401.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2401"> </A> +<I>Maarten Vanraes +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296494806-01296496587-01296501144-01296506494- --> +<LI><A HREF="002402.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2402"> </A> +<I>David W. Hodgins +</I> + +<!--3 01296443803-01296447396-01296486235-01296490705-01296510572- --> +<LI><A HREF="002403.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2403"> </A> +<I>Dick Gevers +</I> + +</UL> +</UL> +<!--1 01296443803-01296472384- --> +<LI><A HREF="002386.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2386"> </A> +<I>Christophe Fergeau +</I> + +<UL> +<!--2 01296443803-01296472384-01296474197- --> +<LI><A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2387"> </A> +<I>Olivier Thauvin +</I> + +</UL> +<!--1 01296443803-01296485834- --> +<LI><A HREF="002388.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2388"> </A> +<I>Michael Scherer +</I> + +<UL> +<!--2 01296443803-01296485834-01296492671- --> +<LI><A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A><A NAME="2394"> </A> +<I>nicolas vigier +</I> + +</UL> +</UL> +<!--0 01296462069- --> +<LI><A HREF="002382.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2382"> </A> +<I>Thomas Backlund +</I> + +<UL> +<!--1 01296462069-01296467619- --> +<LI><A HREF="002384.html">[Mageia-dev] BS down +</A><A NAME="2384"> </A> +<I>Pascal Terjan +</I> + +</UL> +<!--0 01296463792- --> +<LI><A HREF="002383.html">[Mageia-dev] [Mageia-sysadm] Accident +</A><A NAME="2383"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + +<!--0 01296503594- --> +<LI><A HREF="002422.html">[Mageia-dev] Dev Team Call To Action... +</A><A NAME="2422"> </A> +<I>Nex6 +</I> + +<!--0 01296514110- --> +<LI><A HREF="002404.html">[Mageia-dev] please release mgarepo-1.9.8 +</A><A NAME="2404"> </A> +<I>Thierry Vignaud +</I> + + </ul> + <p> + <a name="end"><b>Last message date:</b></a> + <i>Mon Jan 31 23:48:30 CET 2011</i><br> + <b>Archived on:</b> <i>Thu Feb 3 17:48:11 CET 2011</i> + <p> + <ul> + <li> <b>Messages sorted by:</b> + + <a href="subject.html#start">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#start">[ author ]</a> + <a href="date.html#start">[ date ]</a> + <li><b><a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More info on this list... + </a></b></li> + </ul> + <p> + <hr> + <i>This archive was generated by + Pipermail 0.09 (Mailman edition).</i> + </BODY> +</HTML> + |