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diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45c8e9f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002388.html @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296485834.12892.27.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002387.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002394.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296485834.12892.27.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 15:57:14 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2388">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2388">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2388">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2388">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 04:16 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> Hello, +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Now that we have a working build system, we need to setup the last part, +</I>><i> which is package signing. And for this we need a GPG key. So it's time +</I>><i> to decide on some policy about PGP keys. +</I>><i> +</I> +><i> - keys stored on the build system were not secure (all contributors and +</I>><i> apprentice had shell access on the build system and could easily become +</I>><i> root using iurt or other techniques, and then access the secret keys). +</I> +Mhh, the keys are stored on raoh, and no one except few selected people +had access ( granted, there was some flaws since I know someone who +managed to get access one day despite not being authorized ). + + +><i> So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>><i> - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>><i> key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>><i> - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>><i> not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>><i> and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>><i> key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>><i> not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>><i> is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>><i> and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>><i> else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>><i> sent on public keyservers. +</I> +If we want to sign the key, we will have a network connection, no ? + + +><i> - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>><i> We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>><i> signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>><i> keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>><i> from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>><i> not been revoked). +</I> +><i> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I> +Since computer get faster days and days ( until the days you buy them ), +and there is new cryptographic techniques found each year. So it seems +to me quite sane to change the keys every 2/3 years. More often mean +that we will forget how we did, and too often could be bad ( even if +IMHO, one key per release would be nice but maybe overkill ). + +This way, we can check the procedure is working, we will have a robust +key, following up to date requirements of security. And we can fix +problem if any without having the pressure of "the key got compromised". + + + +><i> In this thread : +</I>><i> <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-dev/20110128/002363.html</A> +</I>><i> misc proposed that we publish tarballs of our software on the mirrors, +</I>><i> and sign them using a pgp key. So we need a key for that. We also want +</I>><i> to sign ISOs, maybe with a different key. So I think we can do the same +</I>><i> as for packages key, we create new keys for software releases and for +</I>><i> ISOs, and we sign those keys with the board@ key. And we can tell +</I>><i> everybody that all files released by the project are always signed by +</I>><i> a key that was signed by the board@ key. +</I> +Yup. I would also go on making sure the key is signed ( web of trust, +etc ). + +><i> If we decide to do this, someone from board could generate the key next +</I>><i> week at fosdem after the election, save it on usb key for other board +</I>><i> members, and give the fingerprint to everybody to sign the key. +</I> +I would rather make sure that the key cannot be used by only one board +member. Not that I do not trust people for that ( they are the board +after all ), but it would be safer to have it distributed and resilient +if someone steal the key ( like a burglar, etc ). + +Maybe have it password protected should be sufficient ( except if people +forget that password, or stick it to the key ). + +Pascal proposed to use <A HREF="https://store.ironkey.com/personal">https://store.ironkey.com/personal</A> , on the +thread +<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html">https://www.mageia.org/pipermail/mageia-sysadm/2011-January/002155.html</A> + +Another last solution to prevent theft would to use shamir secret +sharing ( as also said in the other thread, but maybe I am too insistant +on this wonderful cryptographic invention ). This way, people would have +to steal several part of the file to get something usable. +( for Harry Potter fan, think of horcruxes ) + + +And also, I think we should routinely make sure the key is readable +( ie, that people know where it is, and the support is still good ), so +we do not discover one day that half the key keeper lost the key while +moving, thinking someone else had it, and the other half stored it near +magnet, rendering it unreadable. + +And make sure the key is not sent as cleartext on the web too. + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002387.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002394.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2388">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2388">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2388">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2388">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |