diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html | 117 |
1 files changed, 117 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53bc05c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002398.html @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131191224.GM21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002397.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002399.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131191224.GM21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 20:12:24 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2398">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2398">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2398">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2398">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: + +><i> Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 18:26 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > > We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +</I>><i> > > enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> > > 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> > > push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages +</I>><i> > if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do +</I>><i> > too often if it's not needed. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with +</I>><i> the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least, +</I>><i> it is for me ). +</I> +Oh, I misunderstood this as I imagined it was not possible to change +expiration date on a key as it would be difficult to check if the change +was done before expiration. But after checking, it is indeed possible, +and it is even possible to do it after the expiration date. + +So we can do it, but we should remember that it does not protect against +a key compromised after it has expired (as someone stealing the key +can change the expiration date even after it has expired). + +So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was +updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration +time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days +before it expire ? + +><i> > > > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> > > > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> > > > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> > > > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> > > > a revoked key. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> > > about older keys. +</I>><i> > > +</I>><i> > > If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> > > private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +</I>><i> > > will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +</I>><i> > > say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +</I>><i> > > old key is compromised offline. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +</I>><i> > it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Instead of deciding +</I>><i> > now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +</I>><i> > at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Wouldn't it be too late ? +</I> +Considering that it is possible to update expiration date even after it +has expired, this expiration date doesn't protect against some technology +that would allow people in the futur to bruteforce the private key. + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002399.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2398">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2398">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2398">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2398">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |