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author | Nicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org> | 2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000 |
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committer | Nicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org> | 2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000 |
commit | 1be510f9529cb082f802408b472a77d074b394c0 (patch) | |
tree | b175f9d5fcb107576dabc768e7bd04d4a3e491a0 /zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html | |
parent | fa5098cf210b23ab4f419913e28af7b1b07dafb2 (diff) | |
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diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..731545d38 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002393.html @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296490705.12892.41.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002400.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002396.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296490705.12892.41.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 17:18:25 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2393">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2393">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2393">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2393">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +><i> On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> +</I>><i> > If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +</I>><i> > signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where +</I>><i> > an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would +</I>><i> > require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to +</I>><i> > have that key compromised. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have +</I>><i> a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members, +</I>><i> so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who +</I>><i> have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the +</I>><i> passphrase don't have the key ? +</I> +Like : <A HREF="http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss">http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss</A> ? + +Too bad it doesn't seems to be much maintained :/ + + +><i> >> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> >> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> >> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> >> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> >> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> > Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> > release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> > It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> > Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> > when they are turned into a release. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : +</I>><i> - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release +</I>><i> - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life +</I> +We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +enough IMHO ) +2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +push my key after extending the expiration date ). + +And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but +they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ). +And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without +harrassing too much can be quite difficult ). + +We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used +anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say +the key is expired for good, and that's all ). + +><i> - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> a revoked key. +</I> +The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +about older keys. + +If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +old key is compromised offline. + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002400.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002396.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2393">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2393">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2393">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2393">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |