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authorNicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org>2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000
committerNicolas Vigier <boklm@mageia.org>2013-04-14 13:46:12 +0000
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+ <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1>
+ <B>Michael Scherer</B>
+ <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296490705.12892.41.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"
+ TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org
+ </A><BR>
+ <I>Mon Jan 31 17:18:25 CET 2011</I>
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+<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 &#224; 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a &#233;crit :
+&gt;<i> On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote:
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; have that key compromised.
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have
+</I>&gt;<i> a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members,
+</I>&gt;<i> so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who
+</I>&gt;<i> have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the
+</I>&gt;<i> passphrase don't have the key ?
+</I>
+Like : <A HREF="http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss">http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss</A> ?
+
+Too bad it doesn't seems to be much maintained :/
+
+
+&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; the board@ key and we can start to use this new key.
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year.
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause.
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; when they are turned into a release.
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because :
+</I>&gt;<i> - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release
+</I>&gt;<i> - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life
+</I>
+We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite
+enough IMHO )
+2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely
+push my key after extending the expiration date ).
+
+And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but
+they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ).
+And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without
+harrassing too much can be quite difficult ).
+
+We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used
+anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say
+the key is expired for good, and that's all ).
+
+&gt;<i> - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked
+</I>&gt;<i> key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly
+</I>&gt;<i> on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to
+</I>&gt;<i> expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing
+</I>&gt;<i> a revoked key.
+</I>
+The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks
+about older keys.
+
+If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our
+private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers
+will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to
+say &quot;every key signed is valid&quot;, then we are potentially screwed if a
+old key is compromised offline.
+
+--
+Michael Scherer
+
+</PRE>
+
+
+
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