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diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ae412c9f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002396.html @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131172646.GL21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002393.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002397.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>nicolas vigier</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C20110131172646.GL21938%40mars-attacks.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">boklm at mars-attacks.org + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 18:26:46 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2396">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2396">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2396">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2396">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote: + +><i> Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 16:03 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit : +</I>><i> > On Sun, 30 Jan 2011, Motoko-chan wrote: +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > > If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +</I>><i> > > signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks where +</I>><i> > > an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It would +</I>><i> > > require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems compromised to +</I>><i> > > have that key compromised. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > Yes, we could do something like that. Maybe each board member could have +</I>><i> > a copy of the key, but encrypted with the key of all other board members, +</I>><i> > so that it requires two people to access the key ? Or the people who +</I>><i> > have the key don't know the passphrase, and the people who know the +</I>><i> > passphrase don't have the key ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Like : <A HREF="http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss">http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss</A> ? +</I>><i> +</I>><i> Too bad it doesn't seems to be much maintained :/ +</I> +Interesting. + +><i> > >> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> > >> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> > >> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> > >> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> > >> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>><i> > > Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +</I>><i> > > release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one year. +</I>><i> > > It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would cause. +</I>><i> > > Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing packages +</I>><i> > > when they are turned into a release. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> > I think we should avoid keys with expiration date because : +</I>><i> > - maybe we will want to extend supported life of the release +</I>><i> > - some people may want to continue using the release after end of life +</I>><i> +</I>><i> We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite +</I>><i> enough IMHO ) +</I>><i> 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely +</I>><i> push my key after extending the expiration date ). +</I> +Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages +if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do +too often if it's not needed. + +><i> And people should be able to force a bypass of the system of course, but +</I>><i> they will be on their own ( ie, that's quite the definition of EOL ). +</I>><i> And this should be documented, and easy to do ( but warn people without +</I>><i> harrassing too much can be quite difficult ). +</I>><i> +</I>><i> We can also say that we erase the keys once it is not planned to be used +</I>><i> anymore, so we would no longer care about protecting them ( ie, we say +</I>><i> the key is expired for good, and that's all ). +</I> +If we decide that a key won't be used anymore, and don't want to care +about protecting it, I think we should revoke it (or its signature) as +soon as possible, instead of waiting for it to expire. + +I think the only use of expiration date would be if one day all +known keyservers are down and never come back (I think it's unlikely to +happen, or we will also have other problems), or we lose all private +keys, so we can't revoke them or their signature. But if we lose all +private keys, we will also have other problems (like not being able to +sign a new key), so we should avoid it. + +><i> > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked +</I>><i> > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly +</I>><i> > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to +</I>><i> > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing +</I>><i> > a revoked key. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> about older keys. +</I>><i> +</I>><i> If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers +</I>><i> will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to +</I>><i> say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a +</I>><i> old key is compromised offline. +</I> +If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then +it's still possible to revoke the key at that time. Instead of deciding +now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look +at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it. + +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002393.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002397.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2396">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2396">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2396">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2396">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |