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diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3fabfb10e --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110131/002381.html @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4637A4.8030106%40animeneko.net%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + <LINK REL="Previous" HREF="002380.html"> + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002385.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Motoko-chan</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C4D4637A4.8030106%40animeneko.net%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">motokochan at animeneko.net + </A><BR> + <I>Mon Jan 31 05:16:36 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2381">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2381">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2381">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2381">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>On 01/30/2011 07:16 PM, nicolas vigier wrote: +><i> So I propose that we use two keys : +</I>><i> - We sign all packages from all repositories using only one key. This +</I>><i> key is stored on the buildsystem. We can call it <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org.</A> +</I>Sounds good to me. + +><i> - We have an other key, that we call <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> This key is +</I>><i> not used on any online server, and is supposed to never be changed, +</I>><i> and should not be compromised. Only a few people have a copy of this +</I>><i> key (some people from board ?), kept on a usb key hidden somewhere, but +</I>><i> not on their laptop or any computer with internet connection. This key +</I>><i> is used to sign the key <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">packages at mageia.org</A> (and revoke it if needed), +</I>><i> and other official keys of the project, but never used for anything +</I>><i> else (not for receiving encrypted messages). And the signature is +</I>><i> sent on public keyservers. +</I>If possible, using a split key so that no single person can revoke a +signature or sign a key would be useful. This would prevent attacks +where an individual might be tricked into signing an attacker's key. It +would require multiple people to be tricked or have their systems +compromised to have that key compromised. + + +><i> - We add the <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org</A> public key inside the urpmi package. +</I>><i> We change urpmi so that it refuses to use any key which has not been +</I>><i> signed by <A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">board at mageia.org.</A> And urpmi should frequently update the +</I>><i> keys it is using from public keyservers to check that its signature +</I>><i> from board@ has not been revoked (or that the key self signature has +</I>><i> not been revoked). +</I>What about third-party repositories, like PLF is to Mandriva? Making +that change would require that each of those repository owners have +their key signed to work with the urpmi framework. This could either +mean the death of urpmi for managing packages, diluting the trust of the +board@ key, or discouraging outside contributions. + +What if urpmi automatically trusts packages signed with a key signed by +board@ and prompt on the first install of a package that is signed by a +different key? The yum tool used by Fedora, RHEL, and CentOS works very +well by prompting on new keys. + + +><i> - In case we think the packages@ key may have been compromised, or is +</I>><i> too old, or we want to change it for any other reason, we revoke the +</I>><i> key, and/or revoke the signature from board@ so that it is no +</I>><i> longer accepted by urpmi. We create a new key, we sign it with +</I>><i> the board@ key and we can start to use this new key. +</I>Sounds good. I'd almost suggest a new packages signing key for each new +release that is valid for the supported life of the release plus one +year. It's a bit more work, but would reduce the damage a key leak would +cause. Unfortunately, this would bring back the problems of re-signing +packages when they are turned into a release. + + - Michael +</PRE> + + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + <LI>Previous message: <A HREF="002380.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002385.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2381">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2381">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2381">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2381">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |