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+ <H1>[Mageia-dev] Will this work for a build system?</H1>
+ <B>Buchan Milne</B>
+ <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20Will%20this%20work%20for%20a%20build%20system%3F&In-Reply-To=%3C201009271131.19089.bgmilne%40multilinks.com%3E"
+ TITLE="[Mageia-dev] Will this work for a build system?">bgmilne at multilinks.com
+ </A><BR>
+ <I>Mon Sep 27 12:31:18 CEST 2010</I>
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+<PRE>On Monday, 27 September 2010 10:51:19 Giuseppe Ghib&#242; wrote:
+&gt;<i> 2010/9/27 Michael Scherer &lt;<A HREF="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">misc at zarb.org</A>&gt;
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; Le lundi 27 septembre 2010 &#224; 03:19 +0200, vfmBOFH a &#233;crit :
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; What about virtualization?
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt;
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; Maybe we could set-up some kind of cluster of remote and dedicated
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; vm's as a
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; unique build system.
+</I>
+Are you familiar with how the Mandriva build cluster worked? If not, you
+should try and familiarise yourself with it first. While there are areas for
+improvement, most of the time it worked very effectively.
+
+&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; Could be a good workaround over security and
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; &gt; integrity issues, 'cause we are using a &quot;single&quot; build system.
+</I>
+You need to explain further how &quot;remote&quot; VMs can be used to workaround
+security issues ...
+
+&gt;<i> &gt; Well, how do you garantee that the person who have physical access do
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; not mess with the vm image ?
+</I>
+Again, as I said earlier, you need to be able to maintain the entire integrity
+of the build environment/tool chain, not just the source of software being
+compiled (to avoid trojaned compiler, possibly injected by trojan hypervisor
+etc.).
+
+&gt;<i> &gt; Look at libvirt developers blog ( <A HREF="http://rwmj.wordpress.com/">http://rwmj.wordpress.com/</A> ) to see
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; how easy it can be to externally mess with a virtual instance if you are
+</I>&gt;<i> &gt; root on the host computer.
+</I>
+&gt;<i> The only way of doing this is NOT letting anyone packaging or uploading a
+</I>&gt;<i> tarball.
+</I>
+This is not the only requirement.
+
+&gt;<i> Just have two different building system. One &quot;secure&quot; and the
+</I>&gt;<i> other of contributors (not unsecure, but with less checking). The secure
+</I>&gt;<i> one would download the tarball automatically from the original
+</I>&gt;<i> repositories:
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> e.g.: suppose there is a package SPEC file containing:
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> Source: <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz</A>
+</I>&gt;<i> Source1: <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig</A>
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> An automatic system would try to retrieve from the <A HREF="http://blabla.com/">http://blabla.com/</A> site
+</I>&gt;<i> the packages
+</I>&gt;<i> <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz,">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz,</A> or if not exists
+</I>&gt;<i> <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.bz2">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.bz2</A> or
+</I>&gt;<i> <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.gz">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.gz</A> or
+</I>&gt;<i> <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.</A> Then would retrieve the signature
+</I>&gt;<i> <A HREF="http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig">http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig</A> and would check with the one from
+</I>&gt;<i> the Database of signatures which has been already populated on the secure
+</I>&gt;<i> system. If the signatures checking would match, then tarball would be
+</I>&gt;<i> uploaded to the &quot;secure&quot; system svn and used for building instead of the
+</I>&gt;<i> one from the contributor/package maintainer.
+</I>&gt;<i>
+</I>&gt;<i> [Of course the system would fail if the package maintainer has downloaded
+</I>&gt;<i> the source tarball from the svn and not from a canonical repository, and to
+</I>&gt;<i> be further secure this system would require also signing of Patches].
+</I>
+IMHO, you should also keep the public keys of tarball signers. Please have a
+look at the samba SPEC file, which does verification of the tarball signature
+during %prep. In conjunction with the existing build tools (repsys/mdvsys
+etc.), a single command ('mdvsys update samba xxx') currently (usually)
+updates and submits the package, and building it at any time validates the
+source tarball.
+
+Actually, I still need to petition other security-sensitive packages which
+have previously said that tarball signing is irrelevant (due to the problem of
+first establishing trust of public keys etc.).
+
+Regards,
+Buchan
+</PRE>
+
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