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diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110201/002405.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110201/002405.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3311a8554 --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20110201/002405.html @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN"> +<HTML> + <HEAD> + <TITLE> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing + </TITLE> + <LINK REL="Index" HREF="index.html" > + <LINK REL="made" HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296515736.12892.143.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E"> + <META NAME="robots" CONTENT="index,nofollow"> + <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + + <LINK REL="Next" HREF="002406.html"> + </HEAD> + <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff"> + <H1>[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing</H1> + <B>Michael Scherer</B> + <A HREF="mailto:mageia-dev%40mageia.org?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BMageia-dev%5D%20PGP%20keys%20and%20package%20signing&In-Reply-To=%3C1296515736.12892.143.camel%40akroma.ephaone.org%3E" + TITLE="[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing">misc at zarb.org + </A><BR> + <I>Tue Feb 1 00:15:36 CET 2011</I> + <P><UL> + + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002406.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2405">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2405">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2405">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2405">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + <HR> +<!--beginarticle--> +<PRE>Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 21:49 +0000, Dick Gevers a écrit : +><i> On Mon, 31 Jan 2011 17:18:25 +0100, Michael Scherer wrote about Re: +</I>><i> [Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing: +</I>><i> +</I>><i> >The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks +</I>><i> >about older keys. +</I>><i> > +</I>><i> >If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our +</I>><i> >private key by bruteforce on the public one +</I>><i> +</I>><i> You can never ever obtain the private key from the public one, that is +</I>><i> impossible. It can only be compromised if someone looses the private key +</I>><i> plus the password is cracked. +</I> +Some secure systems have been seen compromised ( like +<A HREF="http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/,">http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/,</A> who explain how the whole SSL +business was compromised 2 years ago, or see the GSM being cracked at +this year 27C3 ). + +And Debian also got ride of older vulnerable gpg keys ( see +<A HREF="http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2010/04/msg00018.html">http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2010/04/msg00018.html</A> and +<A HREF="http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2010/09/msg00003.html">http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2010/09/msg00003.html</A> ), +so I would not be so optimistic about the "never". + +Technically, MD5 should not have been reversible, but see how easy it is +using a rainbow table. Granted, that's a 20 year protocol, but that's +still widely used in lots of software. + +-- +Michael Scherer + +</PRE> + + +<!--endarticle--> + <HR> + <P><UL> + <!--threads--> + + <LI>Next message: <A HREF="002406.html">[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing +</A></li> + <LI> <B>Messages sorted by:</B> + <a href="date.html#2405">[ date ]</a> + <a href="thread.html#2405">[ thread ]</a> + <a href="subject.html#2405">[ subject ]</a> + <a href="author.html#2405">[ author ]</a> + </LI> + </UL> + +<hr> +<a href="https://www.mageia.org/mailman/listinfo/mageia-dev">More information about the Mageia-dev +mailing list</a><br> +</body></html> |