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Diffstat (limited to 'mdk-stage1/ppp/pppd/auth.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | mdk-stage1/ppp/pppd/auth.c | 1952 |
1 files changed, 1952 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mdk-stage1/ppp/pppd/auth.c b/mdk-stage1/ppp/pppd/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c1912c252 --- /dev/null +++ b/mdk-stage1/ppp/pppd/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,1952 @@ +/* + * auth.c - PPP authentication and phase control. + * + * Copyright (c) 1993 The Australian National University. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by the Australian National University. The name of the University + * may not be used to endorse or promote products derived from this + * software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + * + * Copyright (c) 1989 Carnegie Mellon University. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by Carnegie Mellon University. The name of the + * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + */ + +#define RCSID "$Id$" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <pwd.h> +#include <grp.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <utmp.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#if defined(_PATH_LASTLOG) && defined(_linux_) +#include <lastlog.h> +#endif + +#include <netdb.h> +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <arpa/inet.h> + +#ifdef USE_PAM +#include <security/pam_appl.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAS_SHADOW +#include <shadow.h> +#ifndef PW_PPP +#define PW_PPP PW_LOGIN +#endif +#endif + +#include "pppd.h" +#include "fsm.h" +#include "lcp.h" +#include "ipcp.h" +#include "upap.h" +#include "chap.h" +#ifdef CBCP_SUPPORT +#include "cbcp.h" +#endif +#include "pathnames.h" + +static const char rcsid[] = RCSID; + +/* Bits in scan_authfile return value */ +#define NONWILD_SERVER 1 +#define NONWILD_CLIENT 2 + +#define ISWILD(word) (word[0] == '*' && word[1] == 0) + +/* The name by which the peer authenticated itself to us. */ +char peer_authname[MAXNAMELEN]; + +/* Records which authentication operations haven't completed yet. */ +static int auth_pending[NUM_PPP]; + +/* Set if we have successfully called plogin() */ +static int logged_in; + +/* List of addresses which the peer may use. */ +static struct permitted_ip *addresses[NUM_PPP]; + +/* Wordlist giving addresses which the peer may use + without authenticating itself. */ +static struct wordlist *noauth_addrs; + +/* Extra options to apply, from the secrets file entry for the peer. */ +static struct wordlist *extra_options; + +/* Number of network protocols which we have opened. */ +static int num_np_open; + +/* Number of network protocols which have come up. */ +static int num_np_up; + +/* Set if we got the contents of passwd[] from the pap-secrets file. */ +static int passwd_from_file; + +/* Set if we require authentication only because we have a default route. */ +static bool default_auth; + +/* Hook to enable a plugin to control the idle time limit */ +int (*idle_time_hook) __P((struct ppp_idle *)) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to say whether we can possibly authenticate any peer */ +int (*pap_check_hook) __P((void)) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to check the PAP user and password */ +int (*pap_auth_hook) __P((char *user, char *passwd, char **msgp, + struct wordlist **paddrs, + struct wordlist **popts)) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to know about the PAP user logout */ +void (*pap_logout_hook) __P((void)) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to get the PAP password for authenticating us */ +int (*pap_passwd_hook) __P((char *user, char *passwd)) = NULL; + +/* + * This is used to ensure that we don't start an auth-up/down + * script while one is already running. + */ +enum script_state { + s_down, + s_up +}; + +static enum script_state auth_state = s_down; +static enum script_state auth_script_state = s_down; +static pid_t auth_script_pid = 0; + +static int used_login; /* peer authenticated against login database */ + +/* + * Option variables. + */ +bool uselogin = 0; /* Use /etc/passwd for checking PAP */ +bool cryptpap = 0; /* Passwords in pap-secrets are encrypted */ +bool refuse_pap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with PAP */ +bool refuse_chap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with CHAP */ +bool usehostname = 0; /* Use hostname for our_name */ +bool auth_required = 0; /* Always require authentication from peer */ +bool allow_any_ip = 0; /* Allow peer to use any IP address */ +bool explicit_remote = 0; /* User specified explicit remote name */ +char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN]; /* Peer's name for authentication */ + +static char *uafname; /* name of most recent +ua file */ + +/* Bits in auth_pending[] */ +#define PAP_WITHPEER 1 +#define PAP_PEER 2 +#define CHAP_WITHPEER 4 +#define CHAP_PEER 8 + +extern char *crypt __P((const char *, const char *)); + +/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ + +static void network_phase __P((int)); +static void check_idle __P((void *)); +static void connect_time_expired __P((void *)); +static int plogin __P((char *, char *, char **)); +static void plogout __P((void)); +static int null_login __P((int)); +static int get_pap_passwd __P((char *)); +static int have_pap_secret __P((int *)); +static int have_chap_secret __P((char *, char *, int, int *)); +static int ip_addr_check __P((u_int32_t, struct permitted_ip *)); +static int scan_authfile __P((FILE *, char *, char *, char *, + struct wordlist **, struct wordlist **, + char *)); +static void free_wordlist __P((struct wordlist *)); +static void auth_script __P((char *)); +static void auth_script_done __P((void *)); +static void set_allowed_addrs __P((int, struct wordlist *, struct wordlist *)); +static int some_ip_ok __P((struct wordlist *)); +static int setupapfile __P((char **)); +static int privgroup __P((char **)); +static int set_noauth_addr __P((char **)); +static void check_access __P((FILE *, char *)); +static int wordlist_count __P((struct wordlist *)); + +/* + * Authentication-related options. + */ +option_t auth_options[] = { + { "auth", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require authentication from peer", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, + { "noauth", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Don't require peer to authenticate", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_PRIV, + &allow_any_ip }, + { "require-pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, + "Require PAP authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + { "+pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, + "Require PAP authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + { "require-chap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_chap, + "Require CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + { "+chap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_chap, + "Require CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + + { "refuse-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with PAP", 1 }, + { "-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, + "Don't allow PAP authentication with peer", OPT_ALIAS | 1 }, + + { "refuse-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with CHAP", 1 }, + { "-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, + "Don't allow CHAP authentication with peer", OPT_ALIAS | 1 }, + + { "name", o_string, our_name, + "Set local name for authentication", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_PRIV | OPT_STATIC, NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "+ua", o_special, (void *)setupapfile, + "Get PAP user and password from file", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL, &uafname }, + + { "user", o_string, user, + "Set name for auth with peer", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "password", o_string, passwd, + "Password for authenticating us to the peer", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC | OPT_HIDE, NULL, MAXSECRETLEN }, + + { "usehostname", o_bool, &usehostname, + "Must use hostname for authentication", 1 }, + + { "remotename", o_string, remote_name, + "Set remote name for authentication", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, + &explicit_remote, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "login", o_bool, &uselogin, + "Use system password database for PAP", 1 }, + + { "papcrypt", o_bool, &cryptpap, + "PAP passwords are encrypted", 1 }, + + { "privgroup", o_special, (void *)privgroup, + "Allow group members to use privileged options", OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, + + { "allow-ip", o_special, (void *)set_noauth_addr, + "Set IP address(es) which can be used without authentication", + OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, + + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * setupapfile - specifies UPAP info for authenticating with peer. + */ +static int +setupapfile(argv) + char **argv; +{ + FILE *ufile; + int l; + char u[MAXNAMELEN], p[MAXSECRETLEN]; + char *fname; + + lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_upap = 1; + + /* open user info file */ + fname = strdup(*argv); + if (fname == NULL) + novm("+ua file name"); + seteuid(getuid()); + ufile = fopen(fname, "r"); + seteuid(0); + if (ufile == NULL) { + option_error("unable to open user login data file %s", fname); + return 0; + } + check_access(ufile, fname); + uafname = fname; + + /* get username */ + if (fgets(u, MAXNAMELEN - 1, ufile) == NULL + || fgets(p, MAXSECRETLEN - 1, ufile) == NULL){ + option_error("unable to read user login data file %s", fname); + return 0; + } + fclose(ufile); + + /* get rid of newlines */ + l = strlen(u); + if (l > 0 && u[l-1] == '\n') + u[l-1] = 0; + l = strlen(p); + if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == '\n') + p[l-1] = 0; + + if (override_value("user", option_priority, fname)) + strlcpy(user, u, sizeof(user)); + if (override_value("passwd", option_priority, fname)) + strlcpy(passwd, p, sizeof(passwd)); + + return (1); +} + + +/* + * privgroup - allow members of the group to have privileged access. + */ +static int +privgroup(argv) + char **argv; +{ + struct group *g; + int i; + + g = getgrnam(*argv); + if (g == 0) { + option_error("group %s is unknown", *argv); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; ++i) { + if (groups[i] == g->gr_gid) { + privileged = 1; + break; + } + } + return 1; +} + + +/* + * set_noauth_addr - set address(es) that can be used without authentication. + * Equivalent to specifying an entry like `"" * "" addr' in pap-secrets. + */ +static int +set_noauth_addr(argv) + char **argv; +{ + char *addr = *argv; + int l = strlen(addr) + 1; + struct wordlist *wp; + + wp = (struct wordlist *) malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + l); + if (wp == NULL) + novm("allow-ip argument"); + wp->word = (char *) (wp + 1); + wp->next = noauth_addrs; + BCOPY(addr, wp->word, l); + noauth_addrs = wp; + return 1; +} + + +/* + * An Open on LCP has requested a change from Dead to Establish phase. + * Do what's necessary to bring the physical layer up. + */ +void +link_required(unit) + int unit; +{ +} + +/* + * LCP has terminated the link; go to the Dead phase and take the + * physical layer down. + */ +void +link_terminated(unit) + int unit; +{ + if (phase == PHASE_DEAD) + return; + if (pap_logout_hook) { + pap_logout_hook(); + } else { + if (logged_in) + plogout(); + } + new_phase(PHASE_DEAD); + notice("Connection terminated."); +} + +/* + * LCP has gone down; it will either die or try to re-establish. + */ +void +link_down(unit) + int unit; +{ + int i; + struct protent *protp; + + auth_state = s_down; + if (auth_script_state == s_up && auth_script_pid == 0) { + update_link_stats(unit); + auth_script_state = s_down; + auth_script(_PATH_AUTHDOWN); + } + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { + if (!protp->enabled_flag) + continue; + if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->lowerdown != NULL) + (*protp->lowerdown)(unit); + if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && protp->close != NULL) + (*protp->close)(unit, "LCP down"); + } + num_np_open = 0; + num_np_up = 0; + if (phase != PHASE_DEAD) + new_phase(PHASE_TERMINATE); +} + +/* + * The link is established. + * Proceed to the Dead, Authenticate or Network phase as appropriate. + */ +void +link_established(unit) + int unit; +{ + int auth; + lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[unit]; + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; + lcp_options *ho = &lcp_hisoptions[unit]; + int i; + struct protent *protp; + + /* + * Tell higher-level protocols that LCP is up. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->enabled_flag + && protp->lowerup != NULL) + (*protp->lowerup)(unit); + + if (auth_required && !(go->neg_chap || go->neg_upap)) { + /* + * We wanted the peer to authenticate itself, and it refused: + * if we have some address(es) it can use without auth, fine, + * otherwise treat it as though it authenticated with PAP using + * a username * of "" and a password of "". If that's not OK, + * boot it out. + */ + if (noauth_addrs != NULL) { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, NULL, NULL); + } else if (!wo->neg_upap || uselogin || !null_login(unit)) { + warn("peer refused to authenticate: terminating link"); + lcp_close(unit, "peer refused to authenticate"); + status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; + return; + } + } + + new_phase(PHASE_AUTHENTICATE); + used_login = 0; + auth = 0; + if (go->neg_chap) { + ChapAuthPeer(unit, our_name, go->chap_mdtype); + auth |= CHAP_PEER; + } else if (go->neg_upap) { + upap_authpeer(unit); + auth |= PAP_PEER; + } + if (ho->neg_chap) { + ChapAuthWithPeer(unit, user, ho->chap_mdtype); + auth |= CHAP_WITHPEER; + } else if (ho->neg_upap) { + if (passwd[0] == 0) { + passwd_from_file = 1; + if (!get_pap_passwd(passwd)) + error("No secret found for PAP login"); + } + upap_authwithpeer(unit, user, passwd); + auth |= PAP_WITHPEER; + } + auth_pending[unit] = auth; + + if (!auth) + network_phase(unit); +} + +/* + * Proceed to the network phase. + */ +static void +network_phase(unit) + int unit; +{ + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; + + /* + * If the peer had to authenticate, run the auth-up script now. + */ + if (go->neg_chap || go->neg_upap) { + auth_state = s_up; + if (auth_script_state == s_down && auth_script_pid == 0) { + auth_script_state = s_up; + auth_script(_PATH_AUTHUP); + } + } + +#ifdef CBCP_SUPPORT + /* + * If we negotiated callback, do it now. + */ + if (go->neg_cbcp) { + new_phase(PHASE_CALLBACK); + (*cbcp_protent.open)(unit); + return; + } +#endif + + /* + * Process extra options from the secrets file + */ + if (extra_options) { + options_from_list(extra_options, 1); + free_wordlist(extra_options); + extra_options = 0; + } + start_networks(); +} + +void +start_networks() +{ + int i; + struct protent *protp; + + new_phase(PHASE_NETWORK); + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + if (multilink) { + if (mp_join_bundle()) { + if (updetach && !nodetach) + detach(); + return; + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + +#ifdef PPP_FILTER + if (!demand) + set_filters(&pass_filter, &active_filter); +#endif + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && protp->enabled_flag + && protp->open != NULL) { + (*protp->open)(0); + if (protp->protocol != PPP_CCP) + ++num_np_open; + } + + if (num_np_open == 0) + /* nothing to do */ + lcp_close(0, "No network protocols running"); +} + +/* + * The peer has failed to authenticate himself using `protocol'. + */ +void +auth_peer_fail(unit, protocol) + int unit, protocol; +{ + /* + * Authentication failure: take the link down + */ + lcp_close(unit, "Authentication failed"); + status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; +} + +/* + * The peer has been successfully authenticated using `protocol'. + */ +void +auth_peer_success(unit, protocol, name, namelen) + int unit, protocol; + char *name; + int namelen; +{ + int bit; + + switch (protocol) { + case PPP_CHAP: + bit = CHAP_PEER; + break; + case PPP_PAP: + bit = PAP_PEER; + break; + default: + warn("auth_peer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); + return; + } + + /* + * Save the authenticated name of the peer for later. + */ + if (namelen > sizeof(peer_authname) - 1) + namelen = sizeof(peer_authname) - 1; + BCOPY(name, peer_authname, namelen); + peer_authname[namelen] = 0; + script_setenv("PEERNAME", peer_authname, 0); + + /* + * If there is no more authentication still to be done, + * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. + */ + if ((auth_pending[unit] &= ~bit) == 0) + network_phase(unit); +} + +/* + * We have failed to authenticate ourselves to the peer using `protocol'. + */ +void +auth_withpeer_fail(unit, protocol) + int unit, protocol; +{ + if (passwd_from_file) + BZERO(passwd, MAXSECRETLEN); + /* + * We've failed to authenticate ourselves to our peer. + * Some servers keep sending CHAP challenges, but there + * is no point in persisting without any way to get updated + * authentication secrets. + */ + lcp_close(unit, "Failed to authenticate ourselves to peer"); + status = EXIT_AUTH_TOPEER_FAILED; +} + +/* + * We have successfully authenticated ourselves with the peer using `protocol'. + */ +void +auth_withpeer_success(unit, protocol) + int unit, protocol; +{ + int bit; + + switch (protocol) { + case PPP_CHAP: + bit = CHAP_WITHPEER; + break; + case PPP_PAP: + if (passwd_from_file) + BZERO(passwd, MAXSECRETLEN); + bit = PAP_WITHPEER; + break; + default: + warn("auth_withpeer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); + bit = 0; + } + + /* + * If there is no more authentication still being done, + * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. + */ + if ((auth_pending[unit] &= ~bit) == 0) + network_phase(unit); +} + + +/* + * np_up - a network protocol has come up. + */ +void +np_up(unit, proto) + int unit, proto; +{ + int tlim; + + if (num_np_up == 0) { + /* + * At this point we consider that the link has come up successfully. + */ + status = EXIT_OK; + unsuccess = 0; + new_phase(PHASE_RUNNING); + + if (idle_time_hook != 0) + tlim = (*idle_time_hook)(NULL); + else + tlim = idle_time_limit; + if (tlim > 0) + TIMEOUT(check_idle, NULL, tlim); + + /* + * Set a timeout to close the connection once the maximum + * connect time has expired. + */ + if (maxconnect > 0) + TIMEOUT(connect_time_expired, 0, maxconnect); + + /* + * Detach now, if the updetach option was given. + */ + if (updetach && !nodetach) + detach(); + } + ++num_np_up; +} + +/* + * np_down - a network protocol has gone down. + */ +void +np_down(unit, proto) + int unit, proto; +{ + if (--num_np_up == 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(check_idle, NULL); + new_phase(PHASE_NETWORK); + } +} + +/* + * np_finished - a network protocol has finished using the link. + */ +void +np_finished(unit, proto) + int unit, proto; +{ + if (--num_np_open <= 0) { + /* no further use for the link: shut up shop. */ + lcp_close(0, "No network protocols running"); + } +} + +/* + * check_idle - check whether the link has been idle for long + * enough that we can shut it down. + */ +static void +check_idle(arg) + void *arg; +{ + struct ppp_idle idle; + time_t itime; + int tlim; + + if (!get_idle_time(0, &idle)) + return; + if (idle_time_hook != 0) { + tlim = idle_time_hook(&idle); + } else { + itime = MIN(idle.xmit_idle, idle.recv_idle); + tlim = idle_time_limit - itime; + } + if (tlim <= 0) { + /* link is idle: shut it down. */ + notice("Terminating connection due to lack of activity."); + lcp_close(0, "Link inactive"); + need_holdoff = 0; + status = EXIT_IDLE_TIMEOUT; + } else { + TIMEOUT(check_idle, NULL, tlim); + } +} + +/* + * connect_time_expired - log a message and close the connection. + */ +static void +connect_time_expired(arg) + void *arg; +{ + info("Connect time expired"); + lcp_close(0, "Connect time expired"); /* Close connection */ + status = EXIT_CONNECT_TIME; +} + +/* + * auth_check_options - called to check authentication options. + */ +void +auth_check_options() +{ + lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[0]; + int can_auth; + int lacks_ip; + + /* Default our_name to hostname, and user to our_name */ + if (our_name[0] == 0 || usehostname) + strlcpy(our_name, hostname, sizeof(our_name)); + if (user[0] == 0) + strlcpy(user, our_name, sizeof(user)); + + /* + * If we have a default route, require the peer to authenticate + * unless the noauth option was given or the real user is root. + */ + if (!auth_required && !allow_any_ip && have_route_to(0) && !privileged) { + auth_required = 1; + default_auth = 1; + } + + /* If authentication is required, ask peer for CHAP or PAP. */ + if (auth_required) { + allow_any_ip = 0; + if (!wo->neg_chap && !wo->neg_upap) { + wo->neg_chap = 1; + wo->neg_upap = 1; + } + } else { + wo->neg_chap = 0; + wo->neg_upap = 0; + } + + /* + * Check whether we have appropriate secrets to use + * to authenticate the peer. + */ + lacks_ip = 0; + can_auth = wo->neg_upap && (uselogin || have_pap_secret(&lacks_ip)); + if (!can_auth && wo->neg_chap) { + can_auth = have_chap_secret((explicit_remote? remote_name: NULL), + our_name, 1, &lacks_ip); + } + + if (auth_required && !can_auth && noauth_addrs == NULL) { + if (default_auth) { + option_error( +"By default the remote system is required to authenticate itself"); + option_error( +"(because this system has a default route to the internet)"); + } else if (explicit_remote) + option_error( +"The remote system (%s) is required to authenticate itself", + remote_name); + else + option_error( +"The remote system is required to authenticate itself"); + option_error( +"but I couldn't find any suitable secret (password) for it to use to do so."); + if (lacks_ip) + option_error( +"(None of the available passwords would let it use an IP address.)"); + + exit(1); + } +} + +/* + * auth_reset - called when LCP is starting negotiations to recheck + * authentication options, i.e. whether we have appropriate secrets + * to use for authenticating ourselves and/or the peer. + */ +void +auth_reset(unit) + int unit; +{ + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; + lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[0]; + + ao->neg_upap = !refuse_pap && (passwd[0] != 0 || get_pap_passwd(NULL)); + ao->neg_chap = !refuse_chap + && (passwd[0] != 0 + || have_chap_secret(user, (explicit_remote? remote_name: NULL), + 0, NULL)); + + if (go->neg_upap && !uselogin && !have_pap_secret(NULL)) + go->neg_upap = 0; + if (go->neg_chap) { + if (!have_chap_secret((explicit_remote? remote_name: NULL), + our_name, 1, NULL)) + go->neg_chap = 0; + } +} + + +/* + * check_passwd - Check the user name and passwd against the PAP secrets + * file. If requested, also check against the system password database, + * and login the user if OK. + * + * returns: + * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Authentication failed. + * UPAP_AUTHACK: Authentication succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. + */ +int +check_passwd(unit, auser, userlen, apasswd, passwdlen, msg) + int unit; + char *auser; + int userlen; + char *apasswd; + int passwdlen; + char **msg; +{ + int ret; + char *filename; + FILE *f; + struct wordlist *addrs = NULL, *opts = NULL; + char passwd[256], user[256]; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + static int attempts = 0; + + /* + * Make copies of apasswd and auser, then null-terminate them. + * If there are unprintable characters in the password, make + * them visible. + */ + slprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%.*v", passwdlen, apasswd); + slprintf(user, sizeof(user), "%.*v", userlen, auser); + *msg = ""; + + /* + * Check if a plugin wants to handle this. + */ + if (pap_auth_hook) { + ret = (*pap_auth_hook)(user, passwd, msg, &addrs, &opts); + if (ret >= 0) { + if (ret) + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + BZERO(passwd, sizeof(passwd)); + if (addrs != 0) + free_wordlist(addrs); + return ret? UPAP_AUTHACK: UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + } + + /* + * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret + * for authenticating this user. + */ + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + addrs = opts = NULL; + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + error("Can't open PAP password file %s: %m", filename); + + } else { + check_access(f, filename); + if (scan_authfile(f, user, our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename) < 0) { + warn("no PAP secret found for %s", user); + } else { + /* + * If the secret is "@login", it means to check + * the password against the login database. + */ + int login_secret = strcmp(secret, "@login") == 0; + ret = UPAP_AUTHACK; + if (uselogin || login_secret) { + /* login option or secret is @login */ + ret = plogin(user, passwd, msg); + if (ret == UPAP_AUTHNAK) + warn("PAP login failure for %s", user); + else + used_login = 1; + } + if (secret[0] != 0 && !login_secret) { + /* password given in pap-secrets - must match */ + if ((cryptpap || strcmp(passwd, secret) != 0) + && strcmp(crypt(passwd, secret), secret) != 0) { + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + warn("PAP authentication failure for %s", user); + } + } + } + fclose(f); + } + + if (ret == UPAP_AUTHNAK) { + if (**msg == 0) + *msg = "Login incorrect"; + /* + * XXX can we ever get here more than once?? + * Frustrate passwd stealer programs. + * Allow 10 tries, but start backing off after 3 (stolen from login). + * On 10'th, drop the connection. + */ + if (attempts++ >= 10) { + warn("%d LOGIN FAILURES ON %s, %s", attempts, devnam, user); + lcp_close(unit, "login failed"); + } + if (attempts > 3) + sleep((u_int) (attempts - 3) * 5); + if (opts != NULL) + free_wordlist(opts); + + } else { + attempts = 0; /* Reset count */ + if (**msg == 0) + *msg = "Login ok"; + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + + if (addrs != NULL) + free_wordlist(addrs); + BZERO(passwd, sizeof(passwd)); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * This function is needed for PAM. + */ + +#ifdef USE_PAM +/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function + * and the server_login function + */ +static char *PAM_username; +static char *PAM_password; +static int PAM_error = 0; +static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; + +/* PAM conversation function + * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and + * echo off means password. + */ + +static int PAM_conv (int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr) +{ + int replies = 0; + struct pam_response *reply = NULL; + +#define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL + + reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg); + if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR; + + for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) { + switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username); + /* PAM frees resp */ + break; + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password); + /* PAM frees resp */ + break; + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + /* fall through */ + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + /* ignore it, but pam still wants a NULL response... */ + reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + reply[replies].resp = NULL; + break; + default: + /* Must be an error of some sort... */ + free (reply); + PAM_error = 1; + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + } + *resp = reply; + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + +static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = { + &PAM_conv, + NULL +}; +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +/* + * plogin - Check the user name and password against the system + * password database, and login the user if OK. + * + * returns: + * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Login failed. + * UPAP_AUTHACK: Login succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. + */ + +static int +plogin(user, passwd, msg) + char *user; + char *passwd; + char **msg; +{ + char *tty; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + int pam_error; + + pam_error = pam_start ("ppp", user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh); + if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { + *msg = (char *) pam_strerror (pamh, pam_error); + reopen_log(); + return UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + /* + * Define the fields for the credential validation + */ + + PAM_username = user; + PAM_password = passwd; + PAM_error = 0; + pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, devnam); /* this might be useful to some modules */ + + /* + * Validate the user + */ + pam_error = pam_authenticate (pamh, PAM_SILENT); + if (pam_error == PAM_SUCCESS && !PAM_error) { + pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt (pamh, PAM_SILENT); + if (pam_error == PAM_SUCCESS) + pam_error = pam_open_session (pamh, PAM_SILENT); + } + + *msg = (char *) pam_strerror (pamh, pam_error); + + /* + * Clean up the mess + */ + reopen_log(); /* apparently the PAM stuff does closelog() */ + PAM_username = NULL; + PAM_password = NULL; + if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) + return UPAP_AUTHNAK; +#else /* #ifdef USE_PAM */ + +/* + * Use the non-PAM methods directly + */ + +#ifdef HAS_SHADOW + struct spwd *spwd; + struct spwd *getspnam(); +#endif + struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(user); + + endpwent(); + if (pw == NULL) + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + +#ifdef HAS_SHADOW + spwd = getspnam(user); + endspent(); + if (spwd) { + /* check the age of the password entry */ + long now = time(NULL) / 86400L; + + if ((spwd->sp_expire > 0 && now >= spwd->sp_expire) + || ((spwd->sp_max >= 0 && spwd->sp_max < 10000) + && spwd->sp_lstchg >= 0 + && now >= spwd->sp_lstchg + spwd->sp_max)) { + warn("Password for %s has expired", user); + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + pw->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp; + } +#endif + + /* + * If no passwd, don't let them login. + */ + if (pw->pw_passwd == NULL || strlen(pw->pw_passwd) < 2 + || strcmp(crypt(passwd, pw->pw_passwd), pw->pw_passwd) != 0) + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + +#endif /* #ifdef USE_PAM */ + + /* + * Write a wtmp entry for this user. + */ + + tty = devnam; + if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + tty += 5; + logwtmp(tty, user, remote_name); /* Add wtmp login entry */ + +#if defined(_PATH_LASTLOG) && !defined(USE_PAM) + if (pw != (struct passwd *)NULL) { + struct lastlog ll; + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(_PATH_LASTLOG, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) { + (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(pw->pw_uid * sizeof(ll)), SEEK_SET); + memset((void *)&ll, 0, sizeof(ll)); + (void)time(&ll.ll_time); + (void)strncpy(ll.ll_line, tty, sizeof(ll.ll_line)); + (void)write(fd, (char *)&ll, sizeof(ll)); + (void)close(fd); + } + } +#endif /* _PATH_LASTLOG and not USE_PAM */ + + info("user %s logged in", user); + logged_in = 1; + + return (UPAP_AUTHACK); +} + +/* + * plogout - Logout the user. + */ +static void +plogout() +{ +#ifdef USE_PAM + int pam_error; + + if (pamh != NULL) { + pam_error = pam_close_session (pamh, PAM_SILENT); + pam_end (pamh, pam_error); + pamh = NULL; + } + /* Apparently the pam stuff does closelog(). */ + reopen_log(); +#else /* ! USE_PAM */ + char *tty; + + tty = devnam; + if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + tty += 5; + logwtmp(tty, "", ""); /* Wipe out utmp logout entry */ +#endif /* ! USE_PAM */ + logged_in = 0; +} + + +/* + * null_login - Check if a username of "" and a password of "" are + * acceptable, and iff so, set the list of acceptable IP addresses + * and return 1. + */ +static int +null_login(unit) + int unit; +{ + char *filename; + FILE *f; + int i, ret; + struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + + /* + * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret. + */ + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + addrs = NULL; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + check_access(f, filename); + + i = scan_authfile(f, "", our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename); + ret = i >= 0 && secret[0] == 0; + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + + if (ret) + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + else if (opts != 0) + free_wordlist(opts); + if (addrs != 0) + free_wordlist(addrs); + + fclose(f); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * get_pap_passwd - get a password for authenticating ourselves with + * our peer using PAP. Returns 1 on success, 0 if no suitable password + * could be found. + * Assumes passwd points to MAXSECRETLEN bytes of space (if non-null). + */ +static int +get_pap_passwd(passwd) + char *passwd; +{ + char *filename; + FILE *f; + int ret; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + + /* + * Check whether a plugin wants to supply this. + */ + if (pap_passwd_hook) { + ret = (*pap_passwd_hook)(user, passwd); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + } + + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + check_access(f, filename); + ret = scan_authfile(f, user, + (remote_name[0]? remote_name: NULL), + secret, NULL, NULL, filename); + fclose(f); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + if (passwd != NULL) + strlcpy(passwd, secret, MAXSECRETLEN); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + return 1; +} + + +/* + * have_pap_secret - check whether we have a PAP file with any + * secrets that we could possibly use for authenticating the peer. + */ +static int +have_pap_secret(lacks_ipp) + int *lacks_ipp; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs; + + /* let the plugin decide, if there is one */ + if (pap_check_hook) { + ret = (*pap_check_hook)(); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + } + + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + + ret = scan_authfile(f, (explicit_remote? remote_name: NULL), our_name, + NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename); + fclose(f); + if (ret >= 0 && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) { + if (lacks_ipp != 0) + *lacks_ipp = 1; + ret = -1; + } + if (addrs != 0) + free_wordlist(addrs); + + return ret >= 0; +} + + +/* + * have_chap_secret - check whether we have a CHAP file with a + * secret that we could possibly use for authenticating `client' + * on `server'. Either can be the null string, meaning we don't + * know the identity yet. + */ +static int +have_chap_secret(client, server, need_ip, lacks_ipp) + char *client; + char *server; + int need_ip; + int *lacks_ipp; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs; + + filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + + if (client != NULL && client[0] == 0) + client = NULL; + else if (server != NULL && server[0] == 0) + server = NULL; + + ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename); + fclose(f); + if (ret >= 0 && need_ip && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) { + if (lacks_ipp != 0) + *lacks_ipp = 1; + ret = -1; + } + if (addrs != 0) + free_wordlist(addrs); + + return ret >= 0; +} + + +/* + * get_secret - open the CHAP secret file and return the secret + * for authenticating the given client on the given server. + * (We could be either client or server). + */ +int +get_secret(unit, client, server, secret, secret_len, am_server) + int unit; + char *client; + char *server; + char *secret; + int *secret_len; + int am_server; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret, len; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; + char secbuf[MAXWORDLEN]; + + if (!am_server && passwd[0] != 0) { + strlcpy(secbuf, passwd, sizeof(secbuf)); + } else { + filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; + addrs = NULL; + secbuf[0] = 0; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + error("Can't open chap secret file %s: %m", filename); + return 0; + } + check_access(f, filename); + + ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, secbuf, &addrs, &opts, filename); + fclose(f); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + + if (am_server) + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + else if (opts != 0) + free_wordlist(opts); + if (addrs != 0) + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + len = strlen(secbuf); + if (len > MAXSECRETLEN) { + error("Secret for %s on %s is too long", client, server); + len = MAXSECRETLEN; + } + BCOPY(secbuf, secret, len); + BZERO(secbuf, sizeof(secbuf)); + *secret_len = len; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * set_allowed_addrs() - set the list of allowed addresses. + * Also looks for `--' indicating options to apply for this peer + * and leaves the following words in extra_options. + */ +static void +set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts) + int unit; + struct wordlist *addrs; + struct wordlist *opts; +{ + int n; + struct wordlist *ap, **plink; + struct permitted_ip *ip; + char *ptr_word, *ptr_mask; + struct hostent *hp; + struct netent *np; + u_int32_t a, mask, ah, offset; + struct ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[unit]; + u_int32_t suggested_ip = 0; + + if (addresses[unit] != NULL) + free(addresses[unit]); + addresses[unit] = NULL; + if (extra_options != NULL) + free_wordlist(extra_options); + extra_options = opts; + + /* + * Count the number of IP addresses given. + */ + n = wordlist_count(addrs) + wordlist_count(noauth_addrs); + if (n == 0) + return; + ip = (struct permitted_ip *) malloc((n + 1) * sizeof(struct permitted_ip)); + if (ip == 0) + return; + + /* temporarily append the noauth_addrs list to addrs */ + for (plink = &addrs; *plink != NULL; plink = &(*plink)->next) + ; + *plink = noauth_addrs; + + n = 0; + for (ap = addrs; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next) { + /* "-" means no addresses authorized, "*" means any address allowed */ + ptr_word = ap->word; + if (strcmp(ptr_word, "-") == 0) + break; + if (strcmp(ptr_word, "*") == 0) { + ip[n].permit = 1; + ip[n].base = ip[n].mask = 0; + ++n; + break; + } + + ip[n].permit = 1; + if (*ptr_word == '!') { + ip[n].permit = 0; + ++ptr_word; + } + + mask = ~ (u_int32_t) 0; + offset = 0; + ptr_mask = strchr (ptr_word, '/'); + if (ptr_mask != NULL) { + int bit_count; + char *endp; + + bit_count = (int) strtol (ptr_mask+1, &endp, 10); + if (bit_count <= 0 || bit_count > 32) { + warn("invalid address length %v in auth. address list", + ptr_mask+1); + continue; + } + bit_count = 32 - bit_count; /* # bits in host part */ + if (*endp == '+') { + offset = ifunit + 1; + ++endp; + } + if (*endp != 0) { + warn("invalid address length syntax: %v", ptr_mask+1); + continue; + } + *ptr_mask = '\0'; + mask <<= bit_count; + } + + hp = gethostbyname(ptr_word); + if (hp != NULL && hp->h_addrtype == AF_INET) { + a = *(u_int32_t *)hp->h_addr; + } else { + np = getnetbyname (ptr_word); + if (np != NULL && np->n_addrtype == AF_INET) { + a = htonl (*(u_int32_t *)np->n_net); + if (ptr_mask == NULL) { + /* calculate appropriate mask for net */ + ah = ntohl(a); + if (IN_CLASSA(ah)) + mask = IN_CLASSA_NET; + else if (IN_CLASSB(ah)) + mask = IN_CLASSB_NET; + else if (IN_CLASSC(ah)) + mask = IN_CLASSC_NET; + } + } else { + a = inet_addr (ptr_word); + } + } + + if (ptr_mask != NULL) + *ptr_mask = '/'; + + if (a == (u_int32_t)-1L) { + warn("unknown host %s in auth. address list", ap->word); + continue; + } + if (offset != 0) { + if (offset >= ~mask) { + warn("interface unit %d too large for subnet %v", + ifunit, ptr_word); + continue; + } + a = htonl((ntohl(a) & mask) + offset); + mask = ~(u_int32_t)0; + } + ip[n].mask = htonl(mask); + ip[n].base = a & ip[n].mask; + ++n; + if (~mask == 0 && suggested_ip == 0) + suggested_ip = a; + } + *plink = NULL; + + ip[n].permit = 0; /* make the last entry forbid all addresses */ + ip[n].base = 0; /* to terminate the list */ + ip[n].mask = 0; + + addresses[unit] = ip; + + /* + * If the address given for the peer isn't authorized, or if + * the user hasn't given one, AND there is an authorized address + * which is a single host, then use that if we find one. + */ + if (suggested_ip != 0 + && (wo->hisaddr == 0 || !auth_ip_addr(unit, wo->hisaddr))) { + wo->hisaddr = suggested_ip; + /* + * Do we insist on this address? No, if there are other + * addresses authorized than the suggested one. + */ + if (n > 1) + wo->accept_remote = 1; + } +} + +/* + * auth_ip_addr - check whether the peer is authorized to use + * a given IP address. Returns 1 if authorized, 0 otherwise. + */ +int +auth_ip_addr(unit, addr) + int unit; + u_int32_t addr; +{ + int ok; + + /* don't allow loopback or multicast address */ + if (bad_ip_adrs(addr)) + return 0; + + if (addresses[unit] != NULL) { + ok = ip_addr_check(addr, addresses[unit]); + if (ok >= 0) + return ok; + } + if (auth_required) + return 0; /* no addresses authorized */ + return allow_any_ip || privileged || !have_route_to(addr); +} + +static int +ip_addr_check(addr, addrs) + u_int32_t addr; + struct permitted_ip *addrs; +{ + for (; ; ++addrs) + if ((addr & addrs->mask) == addrs->base) + return addrs->permit; +} + +/* + * bad_ip_adrs - return 1 if the IP address is one we don't want + * to use, such as an address in the loopback net or a multicast address. + * addr is in network byte order. + */ +int +bad_ip_adrs(addr) + u_int32_t addr; +{ + addr = ntohl(addr); + return (addr >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IN_LOOPBACKNET + || IN_MULTICAST(addr) || IN_BADCLASS(addr); +} + +/* + * some_ip_ok - check a wordlist to see if it authorizes any + * IP address(es). + */ +static int +some_ip_ok(addrs) + struct wordlist *addrs; +{ + for (; addrs != 0; addrs = addrs->next) { + if (addrs->word[0] == '-') + break; + if (addrs->word[0] != '!') + return 1; /* some IP address is allowed */ + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * check_access - complain if a secret file has too-liberal permissions. + */ +static void +check_access(f, filename) + FILE *f; + char *filename; +{ + struct stat sbuf; + + if (fstat(fileno(f), &sbuf) < 0) { + warn("cannot stat secret file %s: %m", filename); + } else if ((sbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) != 0) { + warn("Warning - secret file %s has world and/or group access", + filename); + } +} + + +/* + * scan_authfile - Scan an authorization file for a secret suitable + * for authenticating `client' on `server'. The return value is -1 + * if no secret is found, otherwise >= 0. The return value has + * NONWILD_CLIENT set if the secret didn't have "*" for the client, and + * NONWILD_SERVER set if the secret didn't have "*" for the server. + * Any following words on the line up to a "--" (i.e. address authorization + * info) are placed in a wordlist and returned in *addrs. Any + * following words (extra options) are placed in a wordlist and + * returned in *opts. + * We assume secret is NULL or points to MAXWORDLEN bytes of space. + */ +static int +scan_authfile(f, client, server, secret, addrs, opts, filename) + FILE *f; + char *client; + char *server; + char *secret; + struct wordlist **addrs; + struct wordlist **opts; + char *filename; +{ + int newline, xxx; + int got_flag, best_flag; + FILE *sf; + struct wordlist *ap, *addr_list, *alist, **app; + char word[MAXWORDLEN]; + char atfile[MAXWORDLEN]; + char lsecret[MAXWORDLEN]; + + if (addrs != NULL) + *addrs = NULL; + if (opts != NULL) + *opts = NULL; + addr_list = NULL; + if (!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + return -1; /* file is empty??? */ + newline = 1; + best_flag = -1; + for (;;) { + /* + * Skip until we find a word at the start of a line. + */ + while (!newline && getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + ; + if (!newline) + break; /* got to end of file */ + + /* + * Got a client - check if it's a match or a wildcard. + */ + got_flag = 0; + if (client != NULL && strcmp(word, client) != 0 && !ISWILD(word)) { + newline = 0; + continue; + } + if (!ISWILD(word)) + got_flag = NONWILD_CLIENT; + + /* + * Now get a server and check if it matches. + */ + if (!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + break; + if (newline) + continue; + if (!ISWILD(word)) { + if (server != NULL && strcmp(word, server) != 0) + continue; + got_flag |= NONWILD_SERVER; + } + + /* + * Got some sort of a match - see if it's better than what + * we have already. + */ + if (got_flag <= best_flag) + continue; + + /* + * Get the secret. + */ + if (!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + break; + if (newline) + continue; + + if (secret != NULL) { + /* + * Special syntax: @/pathname means read secret from file. + */ + if (word[0] == '@' && word[1] == '/') { + strlcpy(atfile, word+1, sizeof(atfile)); + if ((sf = fopen(atfile, "r")) == NULL) { + warn("can't open indirect secret file %s", atfile); + continue; + } + check_access(sf, atfile); + if (!getword(sf, word, &xxx, atfile)) { + warn("no secret in indirect secret file %s", atfile); + fclose(sf); + continue; + } + fclose(sf); + } + strlcpy(lsecret, word, sizeof(lsecret)); + } + + /* + * Now read address authorization info and make a wordlist. + */ + app = &alist; + for (;;) { + if (!getword(f, word, &newline, filename) || newline) + break; + ap = (struct wordlist *) + malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + strlen(word) + 1); + if (ap == NULL) + novm("authorized addresses"); + ap->word = (char *) (ap + 1); + strcpy(ap->word, word); + *app = ap; + app = &ap->next; + } + *app = NULL; + + /* + * This is the best so far; remember it. + */ + best_flag = got_flag; + if (addr_list) + free_wordlist(addr_list); + addr_list = alist; + if (secret != NULL) + strlcpy(secret, lsecret, MAXWORDLEN); + + if (!newline) + break; + } + + /* scan for a -- word indicating the start of options */ + for (app = &addr_list; (ap = *app) != NULL; app = &ap->next) + if (strcmp(ap->word, "--") == 0) + break; + /* ap = start of options */ + if (ap != NULL) { + ap = ap->next; /* first option */ + free(*app); /* free the "--" word */ + *app = NULL; /* terminate addr list */ + } + if (opts != NULL) + *opts = ap; + else if (ap != NULL) + free_wordlist(ap); + if (addrs != NULL) + *addrs = addr_list; + else if (addr_list != NULL) + free_wordlist(addr_list); + + return best_flag; +} + +/* + * wordlist_count - return the number of items in a wordlist + */ +static int +wordlist_count(wp) + struct wordlist *wp; +{ + int n; + + for (n = 0; wp != NULL; wp = wp->next) + ++n; + return n; +} + +/* + * free_wordlist - release memory allocated for a wordlist. + */ +static void +free_wordlist(wp) + struct wordlist *wp; +{ + struct wordlist *next; + + while (wp != NULL) { + next = wp->next; + free(wp); + wp = next; + } +} + +/* + * auth_script_done - called when the auth-up or auth-down script + * has finished. + */ +static void +auth_script_done(arg) + void *arg; +{ + auth_script_pid = 0; + switch (auth_script_state) { + case s_up: + if (auth_state == s_down) { + auth_script_state = s_down; + auth_script(_PATH_AUTHDOWN); + } + break; + case s_down: + if (auth_state == s_up) { + auth_script_state = s_up; + auth_script(_PATH_AUTHUP); + } + break; + } +} + +/* + * auth_script - execute a script with arguments + * interface-name peer-name real-user tty speed + */ +static void +auth_script(script) + char *script; +{ + char strspeed[32]; + struct passwd *pw; + char struid[32]; + char *user_name; + char *argv[8]; + + if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) != NULL && pw->pw_name != NULL) + user_name = pw->pw_name; + else { + slprintf(struid, sizeof(struid), "%d", getuid()); + user_name = struid; + } + slprintf(strspeed, sizeof(strspeed), "%d", baud_rate); + + argv[0] = script; + argv[1] = ifname; + argv[2] = peer_authname; + argv[3] = user_name; + argv[4] = devnam; + argv[5] = strspeed; + argv[6] = NULL; + + auth_script_pid = run_program(script, argv, 0, auth_script_done, NULL); +} |