From 1be510f9529cb082f802408b472a77d074b394c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Vigier Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2013 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: Add zarb MLs html archives --- zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+) create mode 100644 zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html (limited to 'zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html') diff --git a/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6a6f5ac3f --- /dev/null +++ b/zarb-ml/mageia-dev/20100927/000295.html @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ + + + + [Mageia-dev] Will this work for a build system? + + + + + + + + + +

[Mageia-dev] Will this work for a build system?

+ Giuseppe Ghibò + ghibomgx at gmail.com +
+ Mon Sep 27 11:51:19 CEST 2010 +

+
+ +
2010/9/27 Michael Scherer <misc at zarb.org>
+
+> Le lundi 27 septembre 2010 à 03:19 +0200, vfmBOFH a écrit :
+> > What about virtualization?
+> >
+> > Maybe we could set-up some kind of cluster of remote and dedicated
+> > vm's as a
+> > unique build system. Could be a good workaround over security and
+> > integrity issues, 'cause we are using a "single" build system.
+>
+> Well, how do you garantee that the person who have physical access do
+> not mess with the vm image ?
+>
+> Look at libvirt developers blog ( http://rwmj.wordpress.com/ ) to see
+> how easy it can be to externally mess with a virtual instance if you are
+> root on the host computer.
+> --
+> Michael Scherer
+>
+>
+The only way of doing this is NOT letting anyone packaging or uploading a
+tarball. Just have two different building system. One "secure" and the other
+of contributors (not unsecure, but with less checking). The secure one would
+download the tarball automatically from the original repositories:
+
+e.g.: suppose there is a package SPEC file containing:
+
+Source: http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz
+Source1: http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig
+
+An automatic system would try to retrieve from the http://blabla.com/ site
+the packages
+http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz, or if not exists
+http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.bz2 or
+http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.gz or
+http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar. Then would retrieve the signature
+http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig and would check with the one from
+the Database of signatures which has been already populated on the secure
+system. If the signatures checking would match, then tarball would be
+uploaded to the "secure" system svn and used for building instead of the one
+from the contributor/package maintainer.
+
+[Of course the system would fail if the package maintainer has downloaded
+the source tarball from the svn and not from a canonical repository, and to
+be further secure this system would require also signing of Patches].
+
+Bye.
+Giuseppe.
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