From f6b197970ba833ea3e629a29805681fde8d4b811 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yoann Vandoorselaere Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 14:01:47 +0000 Subject: *** empty log message *** --- src/msec_find/find.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 233 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/msec_find/find.c (limited to 'src/msec_find/find.c') diff --git a/src/msec_find/find.c b/src/msec_find/find.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65e8c73 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/msec_find/find.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Written by Thierry Vignaud, + * heavilly modified for msec purpose by Vandoorselaere Yoann. + * + * This code is copyrighted by Mandrakesoft [(c) 2000] and is released under + * the GPL licence + */ + + +/* + * TODO + * +++ hash tables or btree to stock already searched uid/gid for speed + * Pb: since linux-2.3.4x, uid & gid are 32 bits wide ... => BTREE? + * static char **uid_hash, **gid_hash; + * + * +++ check for open & I/O error on log files ... + * +++ Yoann scripts should avoid /dev if devfs is mounted (either by testing + * if /dev is mounted by devfs or if [ -f /dev/.devfsd ] => see with + * Yoann + * --- disable 'cannot stat ...' warning (???) => better log them SECURITY_LOG + * --- disable write test on links => OK + */ + +/* + * (Vandoorselaere Yoann) + * Done : + * - Don't handle FTW_DNR case, since it will print warning for /proc file. + * - Don't walk trought /dev & /proc. + * - We don't need to handle all of the ftw flag, just the FTW_F & FTW_D one :) + * - Use FTW_PHYS to not follow symbolic link. + * - Do not use getenv to get the root directory. + * - Use argv instead of a DIR variable to get directory to scan. + * - Free directory after use when allocated for appending a '/'. + * - We do not need __USE_XOPEN_EXTENDED definition. + */ + +#include +#include + +#define __USE_XOPEN_EXTENDED +#include + +#include + +/* For NSS managment */ +#include +#include +#include + +#include + + +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#define inline +#else +#warning upgrade your so-called system to a real OS such as GNU/Linux +#endif + +/* + * Log files + */ +static FILE *suid_fd; +static FILE *sgid_fd; +static FILE *unowned_user_fd; +static FILE *unowned_group_fd; +static FILE *writeable_fd; + +static int traverse(const char *file, const struct stat *sb, int flag, struct FTW *s) +{ + struct passwd *u_nss_data; + struct group *g_nss_data; + + if (strncmp(file, "//", 2) == 0 ) + /* + * handle bogus glibc ftw + * else we won't print only one '/' in front of file names + */ + file++; + + if (strncmp("/proc", file, 5) == 0) + return 0; + if (strncmp("/dev", file, 4) == 0) + return 0; + + switch (flag) { + /* + * Here is a difference with security-check.sh: + * we don't check for regular files only for Set-UID et Set-GID but + * to directories too. Idem for world writable directories ... + */ + + case FTW_F: + /* + * Regular file + */ + printf("%s\n", file); + + /* + * Is writeable check. + */ + if (sb->st_mode & 0002) + fprintf(writeable_fd, "%s\n", file); + + /* + * Is suid root check. + */ + if ((sb->st_mode & S_ISUID) && (sb->st_uid == 0)) + fprintf(suid_fd, "%s\n", file); + + /* + * Is suid group check. + */ + if (sb->st_mode & S_ISGID) + fprintf(sgid_fd, "%s\n", file); + + case FTW_D: + /* + * Unowned user check. + */ + u_nss_data = getpwuid(sb->st_uid); + if (u_nss_data == NULL) + fprintf(unowned_user_fd, "%s\n", file); + + /* + * Unowned group check. + */ + g_nss_data = getgrgid(sb->st_uid); + if (g_nss_data == NULL) + fprintf(unowned_group_fd, "%s\n", file); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* This function opens all log files */ +__inline__ static void init() +{ + static const char *mode = "w+"; + + suid_fd = fopen(getenv("SUID_ROOT_TODAY"), mode); + if ( ! suid_fd ) { + perror("fopen (suid_root_today)"); + exit(1); + } + + sgid_fd = fopen(getenv("SUID_GROUP_TODAY"), mode); + if ( ! sgid_fd ) { + perror("fopen (suid_group_today)"); + exit(1); + } + + writeable_fd = fopen(getenv("WRITEABLE_TODAY"), mode); + if ( ! writeable_fd ) { + perror("fopen (writeable_today)"); + exit(1); + } + + unowned_user_fd = fopen(getenv("UNOWNED_USER_TODAY"), mode); + if ( ! unowned_user_fd ) { + perror("fopen (unowned_user_today)"); + exit(1); + } + + unowned_group_fd = fopen(getenv("UNOWNED_GROUP_TODAY"), mode); + if ( ! unowned_group_fd ) { + perror("fopen (unowned_group_today)"); + exit(1); + } +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *directory; + int res = 0, i; + int ctrl = 0; + + if ( argc < 2 ) { + fprintf(stderr, "Please give directory as argument.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "%s /usr/sbin /sbin\n\n", argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + + /* open all log files */ + init(); + + for ( i = 0; i < argc; i++ ) { + + if (strcmp(argv[0], "/") != 0) { + /* + * We need to add a final '/' to the base directory name else the + * FTW_MOUNT option of nftw won't work. i.e. : /mnt/cdrom is on the / + * fs (it is the directory on which a CD is mounted) whereas + * /mnt/cdrom/ is the mounted directory. + * Hopefully, find has the same "bug" + */ + + ctrl = 1; + directory = ( char * ) malloc((strlen(argv[i]) + 1)); + if ( ! directory ) { + perror("malloc"); + exit(1); + } + + strcpy(directory, argv[i]); + strcat(directory, "/"); + } else directory = argv[i]; + + res = nftw(directory, traverse, (int) 500, FTW_PHYS | FTW_MOUNT | FTW_CHDIR); + if ( ctrl ) { + free(directory); + ctrl = 0; + } + } + + /* + * close all log files + */ + + fclose(suid_fd); + fclose(sgid_fd); + fclose(writeable_fd); + fclose(unowned_user_fd); + fclose(unowned_group_fd); + + exit(res); +} + + + + + + + -- cgit v1.2.1